Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works

2006

A Civil Rights Approach
Alexander Tsesis
Loyola University School of Law, atsesis@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Tsesis. Alexander A Civil Rights Approach, 39 UC Davis L. Rev. 1773 (2006)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving
Revolutionary Abolitionism Through
the Thirteenth Amendment
Alexander Tsesis

*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 1775
I. REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR FOR LIBERTY ........................................... 1778
A. Liberty in the Revolutionary Era ............................................... 1779
1. Revolutionary Understanding of Political Slavery....... 1780
2. Colonial Statements Against Chattel Slavery ............... 1783
B. Failure to Enforce the Ideology of Liberty .................................. 1790
C. Constitutional Failings .............................................................. 1795
II. ABOLITIONIST INFLUENCES ............................................................... 1797
III. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CONGRESSIONAL EXPOSITION ............. 1800
A. On the Coattails of the Declaration of Independence and
Abolition .................................................................................... 1801
B. Insight from Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment ................ 1806
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 ..................................................... 1818
IV. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE.................................... 1819
A. Early Judicial Interpretation ...................................................... 1820
B. Segregationist Decisions ............................................................ 1822
C. Modern Supreme Court Decisions............................................. 1829
V. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ............................................................... 1832
A. Relationship Between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments .............................................................................. 1833

*

Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law and Affiliated Scholar,
University of Wisconsin Law School, Institute for Legal Studies. I am grateful to Mark
Tushnet, Andrew Taslitz, Carolyn Shapiro, Robert Kaczorowski, and Richard Delgado for
critiquing an earlier version of this article. I also received valuable advice from David
Turner, Michael Scodro, George Rutherglen, and Daniel Hamilton.

1773

1774

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1773

1. Recent Judicial Fourteenth Amendment Approach..... 1833
2. Comparing Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
Powers ................................................................................ 1834
B. Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause ......................... 1837
1. Pre-Lopez Commerce Clause Approach ......................... 1837
2. Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause Approach ............ 1839
3. Distinguishing the Thirteenth Amendment from the
Commerce Clause ............................................................. 1841
C. Construing Thirteenth Amendment Liberty: How Far Might
It Extend? .................................................................................. 1843
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1848

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1775

INTRODUCTION
During the preceding decade, the Rehnquist Court significantly
limited Congress’s Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
authority over civil rights. The new trend in judicial oversight first
appeared in United States v. Lopez, where the Supreme Court invalidated
a statute because Congress failed to show the law congruently and
proportionately regulated behavior with a substantial effect on the
1
national economy. In several cases, the Court relied on this congruency
2
test to reduce Congress’s ability to enact civil rights legislation. On
another front, beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reduced
Congress’s ability to enforce Fourteenth Amendment due process and
3
equal protection rights. Boerne interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
4
to be a responsive, rather than a proactive, federal empowerment. This

1

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
language also indicated that the Commerce Clause would henceforth only apply to cases
involving “economic enterprise.” Id. at 558-61. Curiously, during the most recent term, the
Court deviated from its demand for extensive evidence collection, finding constitutional a
federal statute that regulated the medical use of marijuana despite the lack of proof that it
would have any substantial effect on interstate commerce. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195, 2197 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the
Court need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for
so concluding.”); id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down section of
Violence Against Women Act that created private cause of action against perpetrators of
gender-motivated violence).
3
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding Religious Freedom
Restoration Act unconstitutional, in part, because statute was “so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior”).
4
Boerne limited Congress’s Section 5 powers to passing congruent laws for remedying
state violations of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Id. at 520. Section 5, the Court held,
does not empower Congress to “enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is.” Id. at 519. The Court reiterated this “responsive” interpretation in several other cases,
including Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, which limited Congress’s power to extend the
applicability of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state actors. 528 U.S. 62, 86
(2000); see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (holding
Congress infringed state sovereign immunity with Americans with Disabilities Act); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-48 (1999)
(finding Congress overstepped its authority with provisions of Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act). But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 511, 533-34
(2004) (determining Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, dealing with access to
courtrooms, to be valid use of Congressional power); Nev. Dep’t Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 728-29 (2003) (holding that Family and Medical Leave Act was proportional and
congruent statute under Boerne).
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means Congress cannot “determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation” in order to secure fundamental rights; it can only prevent
5
judicially identified unconstitutional behavior. The Court thereafter
reiterated this remedial interpretation in United States v. Morrison,
finding that Congress overstepped its Fourteenth Amendment authority
in enacting a civil cause of action for gender-motivated violence
6
committed by private individuals as opposed to state actors.
Interestingly, the Rehnquist Court has not similarly reduced
Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, making it an
alternative source for federal civil rights statutes. This Article develops
an approach that sidesteps the Court’s recently placed obstacles to
national civil rights initiatives. The Thirteenth Amendment differs from
7
the Fourteenth Amendment because it lacks a state action requirement.
Similarly, it differs from the Commerce Clause because the Thirteenth
Amendment’s central concern is liberal equality rather than economic
transaction.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s framers drew from
antislavery and abolitionist writers to develop a constitutional provision
for protecting individual rights essential for the common good of
citizens.
Despite its far-reaching purposes, Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence has remained woefully underdeveloped.
The little
jurisprudence that does exist interprets congressional power broadly.
The Supreme Court has recognized the Thirteenth Amendment to be far
more than a provision that emancipated slaves. Pursuant to Section 2 of
the Amendment, Congress can enact statutes that prohibit private
8
9
10
discrimination in housing, education, and employment.
Some
scholars have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches conduct as
11
12
diverse as collective bargaining and hate speech.
In short, the
5

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
529 U.S. at 627.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).
9
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976).
10
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see also Anthony v. BTR
Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2003); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th
Cir. 2003); Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
11
James G. Pope recently wrote about the labor movement’s decision to base labor
rights activism on the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment. James
Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor & the Shaping of
American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (arguing that
protections of Wagner Act on labor’s right to bargain collectively was based on same vision
of freedom as framers of Thirteenth Amendment asserted); see also Lea S. Vandervelde, The
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1989) (“In addition to
6
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Amendment grants Congress the power to pass statutes for the
advancement of a variety of civil liberties.
The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to provide for
individual liberties and the general welfare that the Preamble to the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence made national creeds.
Congress retains the constitutional power to pass laws that protect
fundamental liberties, although it rarely uses this power. Congress’s and
the judiciary’s virtual neglect of the Thirteenth Amendment has not
lessened its significance.
Indeed, the Rehnquist Court’s recent
jurisprudence, striking down civil rights legislation, has increased the
Thirteenth Amendment’s pertinence.
This Article draws upon the views of the country’s founders,
nineteenth-century abolitionists, and Radical Republicans to evaluate the
significance of the Thirteenth Amendment. It explains how the
amendment permits Congress to protect persons against arbitrary
treatment that intrudes on liberty interests. The American Revolution
had heralded principles of a coequal citizenry. Later, the abolitionists
criticized the disjunction between Revolutionary purposes and
constitutional protections of slavery. Radical Republicans then refined
revolutionary abolitionism and gave Congress the power to regulate
discriminatory conduct that the original Constitution had left to the
discretion of each state.
Part I begins by tracing American Revolutionary analyses on the
nature of a free citizenry. Revolutionary pamphlets are replete with
discussions of liberty. The founding ideals of the Revolution were
manifestly incompatible with slavery, but an enforceable guarantee of
freedom for all did not gain constitutional recognition until the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Even though Revolutionaries
failed to eliminate the institutional practice of slavery, they left an
intellectual legacy that the post-Civil War Congress drew from.
Part II connects abolitionist efforts to end slavery with the
Revolutionary commitment, made years earlier, to liberal equality.
Abolitionists interpreted the Preamble and the Declaration as manifestos
against the institution of slavery. This understanding relied on the same

purely labor-based concerns, the thirteenth amendment debates reflected themes such as
racial equality, the importance of access to education, the integrity of families, and the
natural rights of mankind.”).
12
Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendment: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REV. 124, 156 (1992) (asserting that hate speech is badge of servitude); see also
Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389 (2004) (regarding
Thirteenth Amendment and regulation of hate speech).
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natural rights tradition that the country’s founders had invoked. Part III
describes how abolitionist thought evolved during the congressional
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. These debates took place at the
end of the Civil War, in 1864 and 1865, and provide insight into how the
Amendment’s goal of universal liberty is connected to Revolutionary
ideals that the Constitution’s framers failed to secure.
Part IV details Supreme Court precedent on the Thirteenth
Amendment which recognizes Congress’s authority to pass wideranging laws that prohibit private and public discrimination. While
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence has remained intact since the
Warren and Burger Courts, the Rehnquist Court recently limited
congressional power to act pursuant to other constitutional provisions.
Part V explains how the erosion of Fourteenth Amendment and
13
Commerce Clause powers, by such cases as United States v. Morrison
14
and United States v. Lopez, has increased the pertinence of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The article concludes by considering the extent of
Congress’s enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment.
I.

REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR FOR LIBERTY

The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution
declare life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be innate human
characteristics. This was a radical notion in the United States at a time
when slavery was an established practice in most colonies. Neither the
Declaration nor the Preamble, however, granted Congress the power to
enforce the rights they mentioned. The liberal equality that many
colonists envisioned only became an enforceable, national commitment
in 1865 with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
To be sure, encouraging signs appeared immediately after the
Revolution; for instance, northern laws ending slavery seemed, for a
time, to move the entire country in the direction of abolition. The
antislavery temperament of the Revolutionary age, however, did not
translate into universal or national prohibitions against the institution.
To the contrary, several constitutional provisions, including the ThreeFifths Clause, the Importation Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause,
15
protected slavery.
The founding documents of the American
Revolution and their colonial antecedents, nevertheless, were essential to

13
14
15

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-61 (1995).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. art IV.
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the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment in determining the
characteristics of a free citizenry.
A.

Liberty in the Revolutionary Era

The ideological justification for the American Revolution was
irreconcilable with the Constitution’s protections of slavery.
Contemporary political and religious leaders regarded the Revolution as
a struggle for natural liberties that the British government had
16
infringed. That justification was incompatible with the exploitation of
human chattel and the enforcement of slave codes. For slaves, the
struggle for freedom was even more urgent than it was for white
colonists who, like Patrick Henry, preferred death to a life of political
17
bondage.
Some Revolutionary leaders drew attention to the incongruity between
American demands for freedom from British rule and their rationales for
slavery. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, wrote that “[n]o reason can
be assigned why one man should exercise any power, or preeminence
over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they have voluntarily

16
American revolutionists came from a British tradition that regarded freedom to be a
natural birthright. See, e.g., WILLIAM PATTEN, A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT HALLIFAX IN THE
COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH, JULY 24TH 1766, at 12 (1766) (“We may from what has been said
infer, in the first place, that FREEDOM is our natural right, equally with other men.”);
ARTHUR YOUNG, POLITICAL ESSAYS CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
19 (1772) (“Liberty is the natural birthright of mankind; and yet to take a comprehensive
view of the world, how few enjoy it! What a melancholy reflection is it to think that more
than nine-tenths of the species should be miserable slaves of despotic tyrants!”). Laws, the
Revolutionaries believed, could not take away fundamental rights. See, e.g., John Adams, A
Dissertation on the Canon & Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 445, 449 (Charles F.
Adams ed., 1851) (“Rights, that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws — Rights,
derived from the great Legislator of the universe.”); see also SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF
THE COLONISTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE TO THE BOSTON TOWN
MEETING NOV. 20, 1772 (1772), available at http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right_col.htm
(last visited Apr. 18, 2006).

Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life;
Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and
defend them in the best manner they can. . . . All men have a right to remain in a
state of nature as . . . nature of a social compact, necessarily ceded, remains. All
positive and civil laws should conform, as far as possible, to the law of natural
reason and equity.
Id.
17
See 1 WILLIAM W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE & SPEECHES 266
(1891) (stating in March 23, 1775, “‘Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others
may take; but as for me,’ . . . ‘give me liberty, or give me death!’”).
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18

vested him with it.” Thomas Paine, exhibiting a knack for bluntness in
his first published article, entreated Americans to consider “[w]ith what
consistency, or decency they complain so loudly of attempts to enslave
them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery; and
annually enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of
19
authority, or claim upon them.” Even though these sentiments were
widely shared, chattel slavery would linger for almost a century in
America after its independence.
1.

Revolutionary Understanding of Political Slavery

Colonial pamphleteers often used the term “slavery” figuratively in
their opposition to the British Parliament’s intrusion against individual
liberties. While their views on the despotism of slavery and on the boon
of liberty were applicable to all Americans, many Revolutionaries
thought only white males possessed natural rights. This dichotomy was
based on the prejudice of Revolutionary times. Despite their disregard
for the logical consequences of their political philosophy, the founders’
views on slavery and liberty help explain the meaning of those terms to
the Reconstruction Congress, which relied heavily on Revolutionary
tenets. The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was a
product of the U.S. republican ideology as it emerged during the
Revolution.
The Revolutionary generation, at least in its rhetoric, sought to
organize a free republic. The Sons of Liberty rallied colonists against
taxation without representation; Liberty Polls were assembly places;
Henry embodied the Revolutionary project in his pithy statement “Give
me liberty or give me death”; and Paine, as historian Eric Foner
explained, believed America to be “the place where the principle of
20
universal freedom could take root.” Colonists often wrote they were
under the British yoke of slavery because they considered it to be so
21
incompatible with their aspirations.

18

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF THE CONGRESS 5

(1774).
19
Thomas Paine, African Slavery in America, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 4, 7
(Moncure D. Conway ed., 1894) (1775).
20
See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 23-25 (1982); FORREST
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10
(1985); Eric Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. HIST. 435, 439
(1994).
21
BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 289-91 (1994).
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Slavery symbolized the political oppressions from which colonists
demanded relief. The meaning of “slavery” that Reconstructionists
derived from the founders’ writings was “being wholly under the power
22
and controul of another, as to our actions and properties.”
The
opposite of being in servitude, defined by Richard Price in a work that
23
enjoyed widespread popularity, was to be guided by one’s will.
The political conception of slavery appeared in colonial writings as
early as the 1740s. An anonymous author of that decade contrasted the
natural liberty of action and thought with the slavery of arbitrary
24
power. This contrast also appeared in the pamphlets that were printed
during the War of Independence. One polemicist contrasted the felicity
of liberty with the debasement of slavery, which “discourages industry,
frugality, and every thing praise-worthy; introduces ignorance and
25
poverty, with the most sordid vices, and universal misery.” Men who
are deprived of their liberty, preached Gad Hitchcock, are debased to the
“primitive standard of humanity,” becoming stupid, indolent, and
26
indifferent to improvement.
Despite the public outcry against the
arbitrary use of British power, colonists committed even worse
27
oppressions against their slaves.

22

MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 48 (1775).
Richard Price, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, in THE GENERAL
INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND THE
FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM 11 (1778) (“In general to be free is to be guided by one’s own
will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteristic of Servitude.”).
24
See N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 16, 1747 (“Liberty is a natural Power of doing, or not
doing, whatever we have a Mind . . . . Slavery is a force put upon human Nature, by which
a Man is obliged to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary will and Pleasure of
another.”).
25
JUDAH CHAMPION, CHRISTIAN & CIVIL LIBERTY & FREEDOM CONSIDERED &
RECOMMENDED: A SERMON DELIVERED BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT, AT HARTFORD, ON THE DAY OF THEIR ANNIVERSARY ELECTION, MAY 9TH,
1776, at 14 (1776).
26
GAD HITCHCOCK, A SERMON PREACHED AT PLYMOUTH DECEMBER 22, 1774, at 17
(1775).
27
The American Anti-Slavery Society’s Declaration, which the society drafted on
December 4, 1833, pointed out the discrepancy between what the white colonists and black
colonists achieved through the revolution:
23

We have met together for the achievement of an enterprise, without which, that
of our fathers is incomplete . . . . Their grievances, great as they were, were
trifling in comparison with the wrongs and sufferings of those for whom we
plead. Our fathers were never slaves — never bought and sold like cattle —
never shut out from the light of knowledge and religion — never subjected to the
lash of brutal task-masters.
DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 1 (1833).
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Most pamphleteers were concerned with ending the slavery of
parliamentary encroachment on colonial rights rather than the slavery
that colonists practiced. Revolutionary sermonizers and political writers,
during the 1760s and 1770s, decried several British parliamentary laws as
attempts to enslave the colonists. A clergyman who gave a sermon at
Billerica, Massachusetts, soon after the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766,
spoke of the heavens recovering “their wonted serenity, . . . [and]
reviving liberty, . . . . with heightened lustre and beauty” while slavery
28
“vanishes out of sight.” Joseph Emerson also rejoiced about the repeal
of the Stamp Act that had placed the colonists into “vile ignominious
29
slavery.”
Others also viewed the use of these parliamentary measures as
30
absolutist attempts at their enslavement. The Townshend Revenue Act
of 1767, which imposed duties on a variety of items, including tea and
paper, was widely condemned because it tended to reduce Americans to
31
slavery. “For what slavery can be more compleat,” rhetorically asked a
Philadelphia Grand Jury, “more miserable, more disgraceful, than that
32
lot of a people” that was governed by laws not of their own making.
John Dickinson, who became a central figure in the Continental
Congress, wrote in a similar fashion that persons who were taxed
33
without their consent were in “a state of the most abject slavery.” The
same year, Silas Downer, the corresponding secretary of the Sons of
Liberty for Rhode Island, denounced taxation without Americans’
34
consent to be the “the lowest bottom of slavery.” The Tea Act, through

28
HENRY CUMINGS, A THANKSGIVING SERMON PREACHED AT BILLERICA, NOVEMBER 27,
1766, at 21 (1767); see also ELISHA FISH, JOY AND GLADNESS: A THANKSGIVING DISCOURSE . . .
OCCASIONED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP-ACT 10 (1767) (“Surely we have not so soon
forgot the dark day, when the Sun of our Liberty set in a gloomy cloud, which, for a season,
boded perpetual night.”).
29
JOSEPH EMERSON, THANKSGIVING ON THE ACCOUNT OF THE REPEAL OF THE STAMPACT 9 (1766).
30
THE SPEECHES OF HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR HUTCHINSON, TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY. AT A SESSION BEGUN AND HELD ON THE SIXTH OF
JANUARY, 1773, at 34, 44 (1773) (“[T]he Minds of the People were filled with Anxiety, and
they were justly alarmed with Apprehensions of the total Extinction of their Liberties . . . .
[N]othing is more evident, than that any People who are subject to the unlimited Power of
another, must be in a State of abject Slavery.”).
31
Townshend Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3 (Eng.).
32
Philadelphia Grand Jury (Sept. 30 1770), BOSTON EVENING-POST, Nov. 5, 1770, at 4.
33
JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE INHABITANTS OF
THE BRITISH COLONIES 53 (1768). Dickinson believed that politically unrepresented persons
were slaves, and since the colonists had been taxed without their consent, they had, in
effect, been enslaved. Id. at 38.
34
SILAS DOWNER, A DISCOURSE, DELIVERED IN PROVIDENCE, IN THE COLONY OF RHODE-

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1783

which Parliament imposed the tax on tea that spurred the Boston Tea
Party in December 1773, was viewed as the “[e]nsign of their arbitrary
35
Dominion and your Slavery.”
In dramatic fashion, Josiah Quincy
36
proclaimed that “We are slaves!” of the British oppressors.
The
implication, as another pamphleteer remarked, was that persons who
were not treated as “subjects” — or “citizens,” in modern terminology —
37
were slaves. The use of absolute parliamentary power, Hamilton wryly
38
remarked, resulted in colonial slavery. The analogy was not lost on
common folk. A private in the army wrote in a letter to his parents on
July 4, 1777 that colonial courage and conduct would “determine wether
39
Americans are to be free men or slaves.”
These were tragically
paradoxical phrases given that hereditary slavery was then legal in all
the colonies.
2.

Colonial Statements Against Chattel Slavery

Despite the extensive spread of slavery, many colonial poemicists
decried it. The blindness to colonial oppressions astonished one
observer and prompted him to ask how “Men who feel the Value and
Importance of Liberty as much as the In habitants of the southern States
do that of their own, should keep such Numbers of the human Species in
40
a State of so absolute Vassalage.” The Reconstruction would later try to
reclaim the initial disgust with arbitrary oppression without the classist
contradictions that had accompanied the drive for independence. The
Radical Republicans, who gave the Thirteenth Amendment momentum
for ratification, were raised in a tradition marked by a narrowly
construed form of antislavery that waxed in the years leading up to the
Revolution. One Harvard-educated Congregational minister, Nathaniel
Appleton, concluded that the colonial protest in 1765 against the Stamp
Act and its ultimate repeal would have been more glorious “if at the time
ISLAND, UPON THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 1768. AT THE DEDICATION OF THE TREE OF LIBERTY,
FROM THE SUMMER HOUSE IN THE TREE 10 (1768).
35
HAMPDEN, THE ALARM (NO. III) (1773).
36
JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT COMMONLY CALLED
THE BOSTON PORT-BILL 69 (1774).
37
ARGUMENT IN DEFENCE OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT CLAIMED BY THE COLONIES TO TAX
THEMSELVES (1774), quoted in JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49 (1988).
38
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF CONGRESS 4
(1774).
39
PHILIP DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1783, at 341
(1941).
40
Ebenezer Hazard’s Travels Through Maryland in 1777, 46 MD. HIST. MAG. 44, 50 (1951).
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we are establishing Liberty for ourselves and children, we show the
41
same regard to all mankind that come among us.”
Literature of this sort illustrates the shift in the colonial conscience
during the 1760s and 1770s from an almost universal complacency about
42
slavery to a widespread antagonism toward the institution. Most of the
North gradually came to understand the incongruity between racial
slavery and the battle with England to secure colonists’ natural and civil
liberties, and by 1830, only 2780 blacks remained enslaved in northern
43
states. In spite of this awareness, an Amendment abolishing slavery
was necessary because during the Revolutionary War, most white
founders advocated freedom only for those of their own propertied
44
class. Revolutionary liberals, as the renowned historian David Brion
Davis pointed out, “may well have agreed that Negro slavery had no
place in a free society. But their domestic views, like those of the
majority of patriot lawyers and political leaders, were moderated by a
concern for public order, for property rights, and for southern
45
sensibilities.”
The country’s founders’ definition of tyrannical oppression was
unmistakably applicable to chattel slavery, but until 1865 there was no
national consensus to end institutionalized bondage. The outcry about
blacks’ enslavement came from some of the most politically active and
wealthy men in the colonies. Some of them realized the Revolution’s
ideological implications for involuntary servitude. John Mein, a British
Loyalist, pointed out the disingenuousness of Bostonians who grounded
their struggle in the immutable laws of nature, while they lived in a
46
town with 2000 black slaves. The evident contradiction also evoked a
response from Samuel Johnson, an English lexicographer and opponent
of colonial independence. As he saw it, the “loudest yelps for liberty”
41
NATHANIEL APPLETON, CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVERY 19 (1767). Seeing the liberal
success against the Stamp Act, blacks paraded along Charleston, South Carolina’s streets
proclaiming: “Liberty!” MERTON L. DILLON, SLAVERY ATTACKED: SOUTHERN SLAVES AND
THEIR ALLIES, 1619-1865, at 28-29 (1990).
42
See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823,
at 41 (1975) (“What was unprecedented by the 1760s and early 1770s was the emergence of
a widespread conviction that New World slavery symbolized all the forces that threatened
the true destiny of man.”).
43
ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH 222 (1967).
44
W. Robert Higgins, The Ambivalence of Freedom: Whites, Blacks, and the Coming of the
American Revolution in the South, in 4 SLAVERY, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, & THE NEW
NATION 128-29 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
45
DAVIS, supra note 42, at 286.
46
JOHN MEIN, SAGITTARIUS’S LETTERS AND POLITICAL SPECULATIONS 38-39 (1775).
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47

were heard from “drivers of Negroes.”
During the struggle with England, an increasing number of pamphlets
denounced the inconsistency of retaining the institution of slavery with
the battle for the Rights of Man. Benjamin Rush, a physician with many
political interests, wrote that “it would be useless for us to denounce the
servitude to which the Parliament of Great Britain wishes to reduce us,
while we continue to keep our fellow creatures in slavery just because
48
their color is different from ours.” England would not accept the force
of Revolutionary reasoning, wrote another author in 1774, until
49
Americans ended the cruelty of slavery. John Allen, who lacked Rush’s
political ambitions, denounced slaveholders in even stronger terms,
calling them “trifling patriots” and “pretended votaries for Freedom”
who trampled on the natural rights and privileges of Africans while they
50
made a “vain parade of being advocates of the liberties of mankind.”
He further pointed out that a duty on tea was of far smaller consequence
51
than the bondage of a captive.
Religious leaders, just as their secular counterparts, drew attention to
the need for moral reform. Samuel Hopkins’s heart-wrenching plea on
behalf of blacks asserted that Americans were enslaving many thousands
52
of their “brethren, who have as good a right to liberty as ourselves.”
The miserable oppressions of slavery, complained Hopkins, were
contrary to the colonists’ plea of liberty and violated religious morality
53
as well as the precepts of humanity and charity. In 1774, Reverend
Nathaniel Niles of Newbury, Massachusetts, pointed out Americans’
shame in struggling for their freedom while continuing “to enslave their
54
fellow men.”
Clergyman Appleton asked the “sons of liberty” to
recognize that their principles did not comport with their participation in
55
the slave trade.
If they persisted in this confounding callousness,

47
PHILIP S. FONER, 1 HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 303 (1975) (“How is that we hear
the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?”).
48
DAVIS, supra note 42, at 274.
49
RICHARD WELLS, A FEW POLITICAL REFLECTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 80 (1774).
50
JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN’S ALARM TO LORD N---H 27 (1774).
51
Id. at 28.
52
SAMUEL HOPKINS, A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE SLAVERY OF THE AFRICANS 50
(1776).
53
Id. at 52.
54
DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820,
at 74-75 (1971).
55
APPLETON, supra note 41, at 19.
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Appleton warned, mankind would laugh at their pretensions.
The most far-sighted of the religious opponents of slavery was the
Quaker Anthony Benezet. He not only dispelled the notion that slavery
57
was a benevolent institution, but further reflected on how to free those
Africans who had been enslaved. He realized that without receiving
some aid after their liberation, former slaves would be unable to compete
with other free persons. Therefore, he recommended that both adults
and children receive adequate instructions for becoming productive
58
members of their communities. Seeking to calm the whites’ fears about
free blacks, Benezet explained how liberation would help government
achieve security and welfare: the tax burden would decrease because the
obligation to pay taxes would fall on everyone, the trades and arts would
advance, and productivity would increase since more vacant land would
59
be cultivated. Abolition, therefore, would benefit the general welfare.
Liberation meant much more than just ending obligatory labor; it
required colonists to grant blacks the opportunity to participate in the
privileges of equal citizenship.
Some black contemporaries also were quick to seize on the egalitarian
significance of Revolutionary thought to bolster their demand for
freedom. A group of black New Hampshire petitioners used natural
rights terminology to make their point “[t]hat freedom is an inherent
right of the human species . . . [and] [t]hat private or public tyranny and
60
slavery are alike detestable.”
Similarly, on April 20, 1773, black
petitioners from Massachusetts expressed their hope for “great things
from men who have made such a noble stand against the designs of their
61
fellow-men to enslave them.” The same year, in another petition, blacks
from Boston and other Massachusetts provinces demanded relief from
the manifold burdens of New England slavery: “We have no Property!
62
We have no Wives! No Children! We have no City! No Country.”
Lemuel Haynes, a racially mixed minister, wrote that “an African, or, in

56

Id.
ANTHONY BENEZET, SOME HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF GUINEA ch. 11 (1771) (providing
eyewitness accounts of Africa in opposition to inaccurate accounts about enslavement of
Africans).
58
ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT PART OF AFRICA, INHABITED BY THE
NEGROES 71 (3d ed. 1762).
59
Id. at 71-72.
60
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 291 (1968).
61
Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, & Revolutionary New England:
A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777, 62 NEW ENG. Q. 248, 255 (1989).
62
Id. at 252.
57
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other terms, . . . a Negro, . . . has an undeniable right to his Liberty.” A
“Great Number of Blackes detained in the State of slavery” petitioned
64
They requested that the
the Massachusetts Assembly in 1777.
Massachusetts Assembly
give this petition its due weight & consideration & cause an act of
the Legislatur to be past Wherby they may be Restored to the
Enjoyments of that which is the Naturel Right of all men — and
their Children who wher Born in this Land of Liberty may not be
heald as Slaves after they arive at the age of twenty one years so
may the Inhabitance of this State No longer chargeable with the
inconsistancy of acting themselves the part which they condem and
oppose in others Be prospered in their present Glorious struggle for
65
Liberty and have those Blessing to them.

In Massachusetts, where slaves were regarded as both property and
66
persons, blacks brought freedom suits against their masters. During the
decade before the Revolution, several litigants were successful in
67
petitioning Massachusetts courts to grant them freedom.
Slavery’s
death knell came in 1783 from the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which
68
interpreted the state’s constitution to prohibit the institution.
Even the southern vanguard of the Revolution realized the anomaly
between liberty’s cause and the inequitable institution Southerners chose

63
Ruth Bogin, ‘Liberty Further Extended’: A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lemuel
Haynes, 40 WM & MARY Q. 85, 92 (3d ser. 1983).
64
1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Herbert
Aptheker ed., 1951).
65
Id. at 10.
66
See Benjamin Quarles, The Revolutionary War as a Black Declaration of Independence, in
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 283, 290 (Ira Berlin &
Ronald Hoffman eds., 1983).
67
PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH 14 (1997).
68
Commonwealth v. Jennison (Mass. 1783) (unreported), reprinted in 4 JUDICIAL CASES
CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY & THE NEGRO 480-81 (H. T. Catterall ed., 1936) (holding
that slavery violated Massachusetts Constitution’s guarantee that all men are born “free
and equal”). Though unreported, the case is mentioned in Chief Justice William Cushing’s
notebook which is on file in the Cushing Family Collection, Massachusetts Historical
Society. For three analyses of this case, see PHILIP S. FONER, 1 HISTORY OF BLACK
AMERICANS 353-54 (1975); BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
47-48 (1961); ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN
THE NORTH 113-15 (1967). More extensive treatment of the case is provided in John D.
Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on the
“Quock Walker Case,” 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1961). Massachusetts was the only state
where a judicial decree ended slavery. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael
Higginbotham, “Yearning To Breathe Free”: Legal Barriers Against & Options in Favor of
Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1215 n.2 (1993).
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to perpetuate after independence. Patrick Henry, for one, acknowledged
his hypocrisy. After scrutinizing one of Benezet’s abolitionist tracts,
Henry wrote:
[I]s it not amazing, that at a time when the rights of Humanity are
defined & understood with precision in a Country above all others
fond of Liberty: that in such an Age and such a Country, we find
Men, professing a Religion the most humane, mild, meek, gentle &
generous, adopting a Principle as repugnant to humanity. . . .
Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own
purchase! I am drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living
without them; I will not, I cannot justify it. . . . I believe a time will
come when an oppertunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable
69
Evil.

Little could Henry know that the “lamentable Evil” would only be
abolished after a bloody civil war. Thomas Jefferson also realized how
incongruous slavery was in the age of revolution. Jefferson, indeed, had
some premonition about the national catastrophe that slavery could
70
create, believing that it would destroy the morals of the people. The
need for a federal union and the widely held belief in the inferiority of
blacks and American Indians paved the way for a national compromise
that kept slavery intact after the Revolution and set the country on a path
to war against itself.
American antislavery literature of the eighteenth century relied on
universalistic principles of natural law to make its case against granting
slaveholders legal concessions. It rejected racialist biological views,
71
which regarded blacks as less evolutionarily developed than whites.

69
Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), GEORGE S. BROOKES,
FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443-44 (1937).
70
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162-63 (William Peden ed.,
1955) (“The whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most
boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading
submissions on the other. . . . With the morals of the people, their industry also is
destroyed. . . . I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.”). For a further
discussion of Jefferson’s paltry condemnation of slavery, see DAVIS, supra note, 42, at 16484; JORDAN, supra note 60, at 430-36; DUNCAN J. MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE, & THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 126-29 (1974).
71
In his well-known account of Jamaica, for instance, Edward Long popularized the
comparison of blacks with apes and helped develop it into scientific jargon. See EDWARD
LONG, HISTORY OF JAMAICA 360, 365, 370 (1774). One anonymous author divided “Africans
into five classes, as 1st, Negroes, 2d, Ourang Outangs, 3d, Apes, 4th, Baboons, and 5th,
Monkeys,” saying that “[t]here never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than
white.” PERSONAL SLAVERY ESTABLISHED 18-19 (1773).
In response to this pseudo-anthropology, numerous colonial writers denied black

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1789

Blacks and whites, wrote Benezet, are of the same species; therefore, they
72
are on a naturally equal footing.
“Hereditary tyrants,” stated an
anonymous pamphlet from 1784, place whites on a pedestal with gods,
while they degrade another part of humanity and treat them like
73
brutes. Before his nervous breakdown in 1764, James Otis asserted that
74
all colonists, both white and black, were born naturally free. He viewed
the institution of slavery as a despoiler of civilization that prefers the
75
interests of petty tyrants to the value of liberty. Citizens were of white,
76
brown, and black complexion, on all of whom the sun rose daily. The
commerce in humans was against nature, wrote Abraham Booth,
because everyone, whether African or European, has an “equal claim to
77
personal liberty with any man upon earth.” Everyone, therefore, has a
78
common stock of human rights.
Individual colonists, like General
William Whipple, who served the nation from Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, acted on the logic of natural rights. In 1777, Whipple’s slave
said: “[Y]ou are going to fight for your liberty, but I have none to fight
79
for.” These words cut Whipple to the quick, and he immediately freed
80
the slave.

inequality in writings including THOMAS CLARKSON, AN ESSAY ON THE SLAVERY AND
COMMERCE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES 113 (1786) (“[I]f [Africans] had the same expectations in
life as other people, and the same opportunities of improvement, they would be equal, in
all the various branches of science, to the Europeans, and that the argument that states
them ‘to be inferiour link of the chain of nature, and designed for servitude,’ as far as it
depends on the inferiority of their capacities, is wholly malevolent and false”); BENJAMIN
RUSH, ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA, UPON SLAVEKEEPING 2 (1775) (“The accounts which travellers give us of [African’s] ingenuity,
humanity, and strong attachment to their parents, relations, friends and country, show us
that they are equal to the Europeans.”); JOHN WESLEY, THOUGHTS UPON SLAVERY 46-47
(1774) (“Certainly the African is in no respect inferior to the European.”).
72
BENEZET, supra note 58, at 52.
73
THOMAS DAY, A LETTER FROM *****, IN LONDON . . . ON THE . . . SLAVE-TRADE 16 (1784)
(“Yes gentlemen, men of liberal minds like yours, acknowledge all mankind to be their
equals. Leave hereditary tyrants and their flatterers to make distinctions unknown to
nature and to degrade one part of the species to brutes, while they equal the other with
gods!”).
74
JAMES OTIS, RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 29 (1764).
75
Id.
76
JAMES OTIS, CONSIDERATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COLONISTS 30 (2d ed. 1765). In
opposition to the Stamp Act, Otis wrote: “That I may not appear too paradoxical, I affirm,
and that on the best information, the Sun rises and sets every day in the sight of five
millions of his majesty’s American subjects, white, brown and black.” Id.
77
ABRAHAM BOOTH, COMMERCE IN THE HUMAN SPECIES 22 (1792).
78
Id.
79
CHARLES W. BREWSTER, RAMBLES ABOUT PORTSMOUTH 155 (1st ser., 2d ed. 1873).
80
Id.
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Given the extent of ideological commitment to universal liberty, many
Revolutionaries thought that the demise of slavery was near at hand.
Historian Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out that in the years
preceding the Revolution, a general impression prevailed that slavery
81
was a “communal sin.” Benjamin Rush noticed this tendency in a letter
to Granville Sharp, a British abolitionist. “The cause of African freedom
82
in America,” Rush wrote in 1774, “continues to gain ground.”
He
83
expected slavery in America to end within forty years.
That view,
however, wound up being overly optimistic. Another ninety years and
the Civil War would intervene before the Thirteenth Amendment’s
ratification.
B.

Failure to Enforce the Ideology of Liberty

In spite of the widespread realization that slavery contradicted the
Constitution’s founders’ moral stance against England, abolition was
long in coming. This was, in large part, because many colonialists were
unwilling to place human rights above economic self-interest and to
overcome, or even to adequately confront, their own racial prejudices.
Thomas Jefferson’s experience typifies the loss of liberal idealism.
Writing during the heyday of idealistic American expectations, Jefferson
had wanted to end the importation of slaves into the colonies and follow
84
that with the “abolition of domestic slavery.” His original draft of the
Declaration of Independence accused King George of acting “against
human nature itself” by keeping open an international slave trade, which
85
violated the “rights of life and liberty of persons of a distant people.”
That same year, in 1776, Jefferson’s second and third drafts of the
Virginia Constitution contained a provision that “[n]o person hereafter
coming into this country shall be held in slavery under any pretext
86
whatever.”
In 1776, when Jefferson had actively worked to end slave importation,
most colonial leaders were unwilling to go that far. South Carolina,
which would later repeatedly appear as a leader of the antebellum
81

JORDAN, supra note 60, at 298.
Letter from Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp (Oct. 29, 1773), in Correspondence of
Benjamin Rush & Granville Sharp, 1 J. AM. STUD. 1, 5 (John A. Woods ed., 1965).
83
Id.
84
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 16-17
(1774).
85
Tania Tetlow, The Founders & Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1,
11 (2001).
86
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 363 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
82
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proslavery camp, expressed its opposition to a passage denouncing slave
importation in the original draft of the Declaration, and the passage was
87
not retained in the Declaration’s final draft. Thirty-eight years after
independence, however, Jefferson had become complacent toward the
oppression that, by then, only a constitutional amendment could
eliminate. In 1814, writing to Edward Coles, who later became the
antislavery governor of Illinois, Jefferson acknowledged that “the flame
of liberty” that he had hoped would kindle in the younger generation,
88
leading to a popular movement against slavery, had not combusted.
Despite his avowed disappointment at this Revolutionary failing,
89
Jefferson counseled Coles not to liberate his slaves.
Even without the proposed anti-importation passage, the Declaration
90
of Independence established liberty as a primary national aspiration. In
the decades between the ratification of the country’s founding
documents and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Declaration’s universal guarantee of freedom posed a moral dilemma to
politicians and citizens who tolerated and participated in an institution
contrary to core national commitments. Its terms created for the
founding generation the rhetorical dilemma of denying to persons of
91
African descent the universal right of freedom.
Legal restrictions on the lives of slaves indicated how constricted the
definitions of “liberty” and “equality” were to many colonists, especially
Southerners. Slave codes regulated everything from matrimony and
92
travel to living arrangements and the use of leisure time. While the

87

WILLIAM W. FREEHLING,
THE CIVIL WAR 26 (1994).
88

THE REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY: SLAVERY AND

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 416, 417 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). Coles, who was the one-time secretary
of President James Madison and cousin of Dolly Madison, eventually set his own slaves
free, but only after calling Madison out about his hypocritical conscience on slavery. See
RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 551-52 (1971).
89
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, supra note 88, at 416, 419.
90
See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEGROS 129 (2d ed. 1956) (“The implications of the Declaration, however vague, were so
powerful that Southern slaveholders found it desirable to deny the self-evident truths
which it expounded and were willing to do battle with the abolitionists during the period
of strain and stress over just what the Declaration meant with regard to society in
nineteenth century America.”).
91
See ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY
FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 43-44 (2002) (relating how ethnological rationalizations
have been used to support claims of black inferiority).
92
See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 192-236 (1956); EDWARD R. TURNER, THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA 30 (1911)
(matrimony); ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
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theoretical referent of liberty was expansive for Revolutionaries, in
practical terms it meant little for those who were enslaved. The
philosophical principles on which the Revolution relied brought the
despotism of American slavery into sharp relief.
93
Before the Revolution, slavery was legal in all thirteen colonies. The
nation’s principled developments during the Revolutionary Period
enervated antislavery sentiments in the North, where colonies ended the
institution through legislative and judicial efforts. Pragmatism played a
role, since it was easier to abolish the institution in the North, where
ending slavery had little economic repercussion on the labor force, than
in the South, where all manner of agricultural and commercial
enterprises were dependent on it. The end of slavery in the North was
nevertheless a decisive and lasting change born of authentic
Revolutionary commitments to liberty.
In 1774, the Continental Congress required that the importation of
94
slaves cease after December 1, 1775. But the limited power that the
colonies had granted to the Continental Congress made the body
95
incapable of enforcing its decree. As W. E. B. DuBois pointed out, the
philosophy of freedom was one among several reasons for ending slave
96
importation. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, though imperfect, was
97
another nationwide effort against the spread of slavery to the West.
IN THE NORTH 12-24 (1967); id. at 86-87 (matrimony); id. at 170 (matrimony); 26 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND 259-60 (William H. Browne ed., 1906) (matrimony); STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING
A COLLECTION OF ALL LAWS OF VIRGINIA (William W. Hening, ed., 1823) (matrimony); 4
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 62-63 (1897) (matrimony); 7 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 352, 352-53, 363 (David J. McCord ed., 1840) (leisure).
93

Eric Foner, Expert Report, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 311, 313 (1999).
William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteenth States, 31
U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 172 n.401 (1997).
95
Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams in the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade:
The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
96
W. E. B. DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 41-42 (1896) (noting other important reasons were fear of
slave insurrections, slave breeders’ monopolistic calculations, and strategy of harming
British commerce).
97
Whatever good came from the Ordinance’s prohibition of slavery, which applied to
lands northwest of the Ohio River, was counterbalanced by an ominous fugitive slave
clause:
94

There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory,
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted: Provided, always, that any person escaping into the same, from
whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such
fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or
her labor or services as aforesaid.
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The Ordinance applied to an area that would include present-day Ohio,
98
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
Individual states in the North were also moving to end slavery within
their borders. Rhode Island, in 1774, restricted the slave trade, prefacing
its new law with the statement that “those who are desirous of enjoying
all the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to extend
99
personal liberty to others.” That assertion was only partly sincere since
the state allowed slave traders not able to dispose of their cargo in the
West Indies to bring it to Rhode Island as long as it was re-exported it
100
within a year.
Connecticut, that same year, passed “[a]n Act
101
prohibiting slave importation,” and Delaware (1776), Virginia (1778),
102
As for South Carolina (1787) and
and Maryland (1783) followed suit.
North Carolina (1786), those two states made importation more difficult
103
but showed no fundamental aversion to it.
An even more important step toward total abolition was the North’s
decision to end slavery pursuant to core revolutionary commitments.
104
The 1777 Vermont Constitution outlawed slavery.
It explicitly

Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, Ordinance of 1787, art. VI,
reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF OHIO 52 (Isaac F. Patterson ed., 1912).
Drafted by Thomas Jefferson, the Northwest Ordinance illustrates his two-faced
perspective on slavery. On the one hand, he spoke out against its immorality, on the other
he maintained a racist attitude that was reflected in his personal slave ownership. See
ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, JEFFERSON & THE INDIANS 78-79 (1999) (discussing Jefferson’s
contradictory statements about slavery and blacks).
98
PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 78-79 (1993).
99
BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 41 (1961).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 40-41.
102
Patrick S. Brady, The Slave Trade & Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1787-1808, 38 J. S.
HIST. 601, 602 n.2 (1972) (recounting that Maryland ended slave trade in 1783); William
Cohen, Thomas Jefferson & the Problem of Slavery, 56 J. AM. HIST. 503, 508 (1969) (stating that
Virginia outlawed slave trade in 1778); James Wilford Garner, Amendment of State
Constitutions, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 217 (1907) (forbidding establishment of slavery
constitutionally in Delaware).
103
Brady, supra note 102, at 602 n.2 (providing information on North Carolina and
South Carolina); Joyce E. Chaplin, Creating a Cotton South in Georgia and South Carolina,
1760-1815, 57 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 171, 191 (1991).
104
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1 (1873) (amended 1924), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/states/vt01.htm.
THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural,
inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety. Therefore, no male person, born in this country,
or brought from over sea, ought to be holden by law, to serve any person, as a
servant, slave or apprentice, after he arrives to the age of twenty-one Years, nor
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recognizes that “all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are
the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
105
safety.”
The New Hampshire Bill of Rights seems to have been the
106
It provides that the
primary legal means of ending slavery in 1784.
natural rights to life, liberty, and property “shall not be denied or
abridged by this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national
107
origin.”
In Massachusetts, Chief Justice William Cushing for the
Superior Court decreed slavery to be unconstitutional and against
108
principles of natural rights. He considered all men to be born free and
109
These states’commitments made tangible the principles of the
equal.
Declaration of Independence.
Nevertheless, Slavery lingered in some northern states. A gradual
110
abolition law went into effect in Pennsylvania in 1780.
Benezet, who
lived to see its passage, could claim no more than partial success for his
years of effort to achieve immediate emancipation. Rhode Island and
Connecticut enacted similar laws in 1784, New York in 1799, and New
111
Jersey in 1804.
New York and New Jersey took the extra step of
female, in like manner, after she arrives to the age of eighteen years, unless they
are bound by their own consent, after they arrive to such age, or bound by law,
for the payment of debts, damages, fines, costs, or the like.
Id.
105

Id.
Guion Griffis Johnson, The Impact of War Upon the Negro, 10 J. NEGRO EDUC. 596, 598
(1941); Charles H. Wesley, The Dilemma of the Rights of Man, 38 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 13 (1953)
(regarding generally New Hampshire Bill of Rights).
107
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2.
108
Commonwealth v. Jennison (Mass. 1783) (unreported), quoted in PHILIP S. FONER, 1
HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS: FROM AFRICA TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE COTTON KINGDOM
353 (1975).
109
Id.
110
John M. Mecklin, The Evolution of Slave Status in American Democracy, 2 J. NEGRO
HIST. 229, 230 (1917); Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE
L.J. 1033, 1045 n.45 (1997).
111
See, e.g., J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT 25 (1926); 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 132 (1865) (“every negro or mulatto child born after the
first day of March, A.D. 1784, be supported and maintained by the owner of the mother of
such child, to the age of twenty-one years, provided the owner of the mother shall during
that time hold her as a slave; or otherwise, upon the manumission of such mother”); Lois E.
Horton, From Class to Race in Early America:
Northern Post-Emancipation Racial
Reconstruction, 19 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 629, 639 (1999). By 1830, fewer than 3000 blacks
remained enslaved, while 125,000 blacks lived freely in the northern and middle states.
GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTION AND THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE ENSLAVED &
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providing for the support of abandoned slave children.
Gradualism
aimed at minimal intrusion on present owners property rights while
granting no immediate reprieve from a reprehensible practice.
The closest thing to abolition in the South, though woefully short of
Revolutionary aims, came during the 1780s and 1790s when Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware relaxed laws allowing masters to free slaves as
long as the former were willing to vouch that the latter would not
113
become public wards.
Those laws provided for the support of freed
people. The newly freed slaves emerged from a lowly state without
compensation for their years of labor and with few opportunities, still
114
political slaves in a culture committed to keeping them out of power.
Blacks who gained prominence, like portrait painter Joshua Johnston or
115
poet Phillis Wheatley, overcame immense roadblocks.
Changes to state laws did not alter the national situation. The
federalist nature of the Union made it possible for southern states to
bolster slavery, especially because constitutional compromises
diminished federal power to stunt growth of the “peculiar institution.”
C.

Constitutional Failings

Despite the public outcry against slavery, the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 drafted an instrument that was more congenial to the
economic interests of southern states than it was principled. The
Constitution’s founders thereby secured the Union, but at the cost of
continuing the organized tyranny of chattel servitude.
Their
commitment to the protection of personal property overshadowed their
disdain for slavery. The drafters of the Constitution created an
instrument whose propertied biases would later catapult the nation into
a civil war that would make clear the divisiveness and incompatibility of
116
slavery with a constitutional republic.
DISENFRANCHISED 13 (1974).
112
ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH 180-82, 192-93 (1967).
113
PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 77 (1993).
114
IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
61-63, 96-97, 225-26, 229 (1974) (surveying state impediments to black property ownership,
trade, and labor); LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES,
1790-1860, at 103, 154, 157-59 (1979) (concerning difficulties free blacks finding decent
employment opportunities faced).
115
PHILLIS WHEATLEY, MEMOIRS AND POEMS OF PHILLIS WHEATLEY, A NATIVE AFRICAN
AND A SLAVE 7, 10 (1834); J. Hall Pleasants, Joshua Johnston, The First American Negro Portrait
Painter, 37 MD. HIST. MAG. 120 (1942).
116
For a synopsis of the political compromises that made way for constitutional clauses
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South Carolina and Georgia delegates at the 1787 Convention
117
demanded that the Constitution include protections for slavery.
Gaining their votes came at the cost of casting aside the Declaration of
Independence’s universal values and nationally recognizing slavery as a
form of property. The Constitution’s protections for the institution
created a rift concerning slavery that would lead the country into
118
numerous internal conflicts. Even those northern and upper southern
delegates who had sought immediate cessation of the slave trade gave in
to the Deep South’s demands.
To their credit, the Constitution’s founders provided avenues for
formal political change, including a method for amending the
Constitution with Article V. Radical Republicans would later use Article
V to nullify the proslavery sections through the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, the founders did little to alter the oligarchic social relations of
their own time, granting a disproportionate amount of power to
slaveholders, rather than immediately producing the representative
119
democracy that the Declaration heralded.
The constitutional protections of slavery compromised Revolutionary
aspirations for freedom to such a degree, requiring a change greater than
the simple abolition of physical bondage and forced labor. The
Thirteenth Amendment meant to grant Congress the power to end all
civil conditions related to slavery. Known as the Abolition Amendment,
it liberated the entire Constitution. It rendered all clauses directly
dealing with slavery null and altered the meaning of other clauses, such
as the Insurrection Clause, to exclude their original design. The
Thirteenth Amendment also relied on the abolitionist conviction that the
Declaration of Independence guaranteed universal human rights to
citizens, regardless of their race.

protecting slavery, see CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 140-50 (1988).
117
See HENRY H. SIMMS, A DECADE OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY, 1851-1861, at 33-34
(Greenwood Press 1978) (1942) (concerning Georgia’s and South Carolina’s objection to
giving Congress power over slave commerce).
118
Beginning with the Missouri Compromise (1820) through the South Carolina
Nullification Crises in Jacksonian America (1833), the Compromise of 1850, the KansasNebraska controversy (1852-1854), and onto secession (1860) and the Civil War (1861), all
internal conflicts centered on slavery. ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT &
AMERICAN FREEDOM 23-33 (2004).
119
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY: SLAVERY AND
THE CIVIL WAR 14, 16-18 (1994) (claiming that American Revolutionists intended political
but not social revolution).
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ABOLITIONIST INFLUENCES

Those abolitionists who called for the immediate end to chattel slavery
traced their notions of liberty to Revolutionary ideology on fundamental
rights. Drawing their ideas from Revolutionaries like Benjamin Rush
and James Otis, abolitionists argued that blacks deserved the same
privileges and immunities as any other Americans. As early as 1833, at
the inception of the radical abolitionist movement, the American AntiSlavery Society announced its affinity for the founders’ ideals but
renounced their political enterprise because of the concessions to
120
slavery. The Society considered the grievances of constitutional fathers
121
against Britain to be trifling when compared to the plaints of slaves.
Abolitionists, just as the Thirteenth Amendment founders who
followed them, conceived their campaign against slavery to derive from
the colonial struggle for independence. William Lloyd Garrison, a
122
prolific radical abolitionist, regarded immediate abolition to be implicit
123
in the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence. He and
other nineteenth-century abolitionists, the “Garrisonians,” relied on the
Declaration in developing a republican agenda of national reform.
The exploitation of slaves, as the Garrisonians saw it, violated
Congress’s obligation under the General Welfare Clause to act for the
124
betterment of all U.S. citizens.
Slavery, so ran this rather utilitarian
argument, violated the Preamble’s declared purpose of promoting the

120
Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, Declaration of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Dec. 4, 1833, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12, 12-13
(1833).
121
Id.
122
Most abolitionists were either Garrisonians or radical constitutionalists. Both
groups called for an immediate end to slavery. They differed in their views of the original
Constitution. Radical constitutionalists believed that the Constitution forbade slavery, and
the Garrisonians believed that it legitimized slavery. Radical constitutionalists, such as
Lysander Spooner, Frederick Douglass, and Charles Sumner, argued that, read correctly,
the Fifth Amendment required immediate abolition. See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal
Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 498 (2004). William Lloyd
Garrison, on the other hand, considered the Constitution the covenant with death.
Resolution Adopted by the Anti-Slavery Society (Jan. 27, 1843), quoted in WALTER M.
MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963).
123
See WILLIAM L. GARRISON, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE OLD COLONY ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY, AT SOUTH SCITUATE, MASS. 17 (1839) (“[I]f we advocate gradual abolition,
we shall perpetuate what we aim to destroy, and proclaim that the self-evident truths of
the Declaration of Independence are self-evident lies.”).
124
See, e.g., GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SLAVERY 62 (1841) (asserting that U.S. compact “is a declaration before the world, and this
nation has committed itself, that this country shall be ruled by impartial laws, and that the
congress of the United States shall consult in all things the general welfare of the people”).
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general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty.
The national
government violated its constitutional obligation to institute impartial
laws for the general welfare by its failure to stop the exploitation of
hundreds of thousands of laborers. Radical abolitionists recognized that
the nation’s founders had “separated from the mother country” and had
declared independence in order to resist “the attempt of Great Britain to
126
impose on them a political slavery.”
Slavery was incompatible with
the goals of the Revolution as the founders expressed them in the
Declaration.
Many abolitionists regarded the Declaration as a statement of
congressional obligation to protect natural rights against arbitrary
exploitation. The abolitionists adopted the creed that natural rights were
intrinsic to citizenship. Citizenship to them was the birthright of
127
everyone born in the United States. Their political rhetoric extolled the
American project to protect human rights. Natural rights, argued
numerous abolitionist publications, are intrinsic to individuals and
precede society. Civil societies, explained Unitarian abolitionist William
128
E. Channing, are organized to protect those rights.
Many members of the Reconstruction Congress later expressed a
similar perspective of fundamental rights during debates on the
129
proposed Thirteenth Amendment.
Slavery was the deprivation of
those rights, and following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress could provide redress against intrusions on civil liberties.

125
An example of this line of reasoning is found in CHARLES OLCOTT, TWO LECTURES ON
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 88 (1838). Olcott considered slavery to be against “the whole
spirit” of the Preamble. Id.
126
MELLEN, supra note 124, at 55, 63.
127
See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
91, 93 (1849).
128
WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 21 (Edward C. Osborn ed., reprint 1836).
Channing, as other abolitionists, was philosophically inclined to the views of John Locke.
See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 94 (Collier Books 1965) (1951) (writing that
abolitionist constitutionalism was based on Lockeian and Jeffersonian principles).
Abolitionists also relied on religious convictions. See Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, supra note
120, at 14 (“[A]ll those laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are
therefore, before God, utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine
prerogative, a daring infringement on the law of nature, a base overthrow of the very
foundations of the social compact . . . . [T]herefore they ought instantly . . . be abrogated”).
129
See infra Part III; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 695 (2002)
(stating that Reconstruction Congress intended Reconstruction Amendments to protect
fundamental rights); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History & to It: An Impossible
Dream?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1663, 1664 (1997) (finding that constitutional theory of
Reconstruction Congress guaranteed fundamental rights).
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Reconstructionists based their understanding of freedom, in large part,
on abolitionist views.
For the Reconstruction Congress, as for abolitionists, slavery was the
worst of all robberies because it misappropriated people’s toils, talents,
130
and strengths.
Not only did it infringe on slaves’ vocational choices,
but it also deprived them of their rights to transit, fair trial, and bodily
131
integrity.
The right to own and alienate property was likewise
132
essential to human happiness, but it was denied to the enslaved.
Slavery also prevented people in bondage from entering into binding
agreements. According to some antislavery advocates, such as Lysander
Spooner, even without an abolition amendment, the Contract Clause of
the original Constitution prohibited states from passing slave codes
133
because they infringed on the natural right to contract.
Slavery withheld inalienable rights, which are common to all
134
persons.
Theodore Parker and other abolitionist authors located the
right to live a free and happy life in the Declaration of Independence and
135
in the Preamble.
These documents guaranteed that right and any
136
complementary inalienable rights equally for all, regardless of race.
The national government’s obligation to abolish slavery required it to
pass laws providing for an equality of “civil and political rights and
137
privileges.”
The existence of a U.S. covenant to protect equal rights was thus
quintessential to the abolitionist understanding of national government.
The Declaration was especially the cornerstone of the “temple of

130

CHANNING, supra note 128, at 30-31.
RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES & THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY
1830-1860, at 197 (1949) (discussing abolitionist concept of rights in context of movement
against fugitive slave law).
132
See Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, supra note 120, at 14 (“man cannot hold property in
man”); Powerful Language, LIBERATOR, Jan. 8, 1831, (“[T]alk not of property of the planter in
his slaves . . . . The principles, the feelings of our common nature, rise in rebellion against
it.”). Abolitionists, like those in Oberlin College and the Noyes Academy, wanted nothing
less than to enable blacks to become educated and prosperous. SAMUEL J. MAY, SOME
RECOLLECTIONS OF OUR ANTI-SLAVERY CONFLICT 29 (1869).
133
LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 98-99 (1845).
134
Principles of the Anti-Slavery Society, in THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY ALMANAC 30-31
(1837) (“It is for the rights of MAN that we are contending — the rights of ALL men — our
own rights — the rights of our neighbor — the liberties of our country — of our posterity
— of our fellow men — of all nations, and of all future generations.”).
135
See Theodore Parker, The Dangers from Slavery (July 2, 1854), in 4 OLD SOUTH
LEAFLETS (1897).
136
See WILLIAM GOODELL, ADDRESS OF THE MACEDON CONVENTION 3 (1847).
137
See Constitution of the New-England Anti-Slavery Society, in 1 THE ABOLITIONIST: OR
RECORD OF THE NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 2 (1833).
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freedom” for which “[a]t the sound of their trumpet-call, three millions
of people rose up as from the sleep of death, and rushed to the strife of
blood; deeming it more glorious to die instantly as freemen, than
138
desirable to live an hour as slaves.”
When the Revolutionary
generation denied to Great Britain the right and power to violate the
colonists’ privilege to enjoy their natural rights, that generation,
according to constitutional attorney Joel Tiffany, prohibited the newly
139
formed U.S. government from countenancing enslavement.
To radical constitutionalists, who disagreed with the Garrisonian
abolitionist indictment of the original Constitution, it appeared that
some constitutional provisions did prohibit slavery. Primarily, they
relied on the Guarantee Clause to assert the United States’s obligation to
protect the life, liberty, and property of all persons born within any
140
state.
For them, a government that countenanced slavery succumbed
to an oligarchy of arbitrary disenfranchisement and enslavement, neither
141
of which was consistent with a republican form of government.
The
social order of owning slaves was incompatible with a polity committed
to the protection of civil liberties through representation. Slavery was
analogous to the despotism against which the colonies rebelled, and it
142
was conducive to a concentration of power harmful to basic liberties.
Crucially, however, abolitionist belief that the Declaration was a
fundamental law of the United States overlooked that document’s lack of
143
an enforcement provision.
The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment would eventually fill that deficiency.
III.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CONGRESSIONAL EXPOSITION

The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment adopted abolitionist ideas
on the universality of fundamental rights and made them
constitutionally viable. The Thirty-Eighth Congress, which framed the
138

Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y, supra note 120, at 12.
TIFFANY, supra note 127, at 29.
140
See, e.g., Alvan Stewart, Argument, on the Question Whether the New Constitution of
1844 Abolished Slavery in New Jersey, in WRITINGS & SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART, ON
SLAVERY 272, 336-37 (Luther R. Marsh ed., 1860) (“[A] republican form of government was
born free and equal, and entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This, we
knew, would by force of this provision in the constitution of the United States, if faithfully
honored, blot out slavery from every State constitution.”).
141
See SPOONER, supra note 133, at 106.
142
For a more detailed discussion of this point, see DANIEL J. MCINERNEY, THE
FORTUNATE HEIRS OF FREEDOM: ABOLITION & REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 16-17 (1994).
143
See Liberty Platform of 1844, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1956, at 5
(Donald B. Johnson ed., 1978).
139
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terms of the Amendment, meant to enforce the Declaration of
Independence’s statement of equal liberty and to provide for the general
welfare promised under the Preamble to the Constitution.
The
Amendment gave Congress the power, through the Enforcement Clause,
to pass national laws in furtherance of civil rights. This approach
increased federal authority over acts of discrimination. The Amendment
was a radical break from the antebellum deference to states in matters of
group relations.
A.

On the Coattails of the Declaration of Independence and Abolition

Abolitionists deeply influenced the thinking of Republican
Reconstructionists. Several of the principal congressional leaders during
the Thirteenth Amendment debates had long been committed to
abolitionism. Representative Thaddeus Stevens, for one, had actively
participated in abolitionism since his early years. As an attorney, he
represented fugitive slaves for no fee. In 1849, at age fifty-seven, he
entered politics in response to the agitation over slavery after the cession
144
of Mexican lands.
Stevens was the chairman of the powerful
Committee on the Ways and Means during the debates on the Thirteenth
Amendment and, later, of the Committee on Appropriations during the
145
debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Senator Charles Sumner was another early convert to abolitionism.
Sumner’s convictions against slavery were born of his experience with its
unyielding practices and ideology. He had been a dedicated abolitionist
146
since 1835, when he first subscribed to Garrison’s Liberator.
Sumner
was the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations throughout the
debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and on the Civil Rights Act of
147
1866.
Both Stevens and Sumner brought the Revolutionary natural rights
tradition to the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and made those
144
JAMES G. BLAINE, 1 TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD WITH A
REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF 1860, at 25 (1884);
JAMES F. RHODES, 1 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850, at 54144 (1904); WILLIAM L. RICHTER, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1877, at 371-72 (1996).
145
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Thaddeus Stevens,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000887 (last visited Apr. 18,
2006) (providing biographical information on Thaddeus Stevens).
146
JAMES F. RHODES, 1 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
TO THE FINAL RESTORATION OF HOME RULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877, at 227-28 (1892).
147
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Charles Sumner Webpage,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S001068 (last visited Apr. 18,
2006) (providing biographical information about Charles Sumner).
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148

principles a part of the Constitution.
Sumner’s arguments against
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill were representative of the ideas he
continued to champion during the debates on the Thirteenth
149
Amendment.
“Slavery,” he stated in one speech, “is an infraction of
the immutable law of nature, and, as such, cannot be considered a
natural incident to any sovereignty, especially in a country which has
solemnly declared, in its Declaration of Independence, the inalienable
150
right of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
During the Civil War, many Republicans adopted radical abolitionist
principles concerning the federal government’s obligation to eradicate
slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment’s grant of power to Congress over
matters resembling incidents of servitude signaled a break from
151
moderate antislavery leanings.
Moderates wanted states to gradually
and separately end slavery. But, for a brief time at the end of the Civil
152
War, a radical form of abolitionism held the reins of Congress.
President Abraham Lincoln abandoned gradualism by 1863 and
eventually supported immediate abolition through the Thirteenth
153
Amendment. He had embraced natural rights philosophy years before
154
he sat in the Oval Office.
Lincoln believed that the Declaration’s
155
guarantees applied equally to whites and blacks.
He asserted that

148
Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal Protection Clause: Lessons
from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understanding of Equality, 13 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 429, 436-37 (2004) (describing Stevens and Sumner as enervated by natural
rights principles of Declaration of Independence).
149
For background on the Kansas-Nebraska Controversy, see ARTHUR C. COLE, THE
IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 1850-1865, at 272-75 (1934); AVERY CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE
CIVIL WAR 325-26, 328-31 (1942); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 121, 123 (Ballantine Books 1989) (1988); ALLAN NEVINS, 2 ORDEAL OF THE
UNION 86-88, 92, 98, 103-05, 107-08, 121 (1947); ROBERT R. RUSSET, CRITICAL STUDIES IN
ANTEBELLUM SECTIONALISM 25 (1972); LAWRENCE R. TENZER, THE FORGOTTEN CAUSE OF THE
CIVIL WAR: A NEW LOOK AT THE SLAVERY ISSUE 89 (1997); James Ford Rhodes, Antecedents
of the American Civil War, in THE CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 56 (Edwin C.
Rozwenc ed., 2d ed. 1972).
150
CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 268 (1854).
151
DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE & THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, & LAW
OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 98-99 (1993).
152
See supra text accompanying notes 121-39 (dealing with Radical leadership in 38th
Congress).
153
See infra text accompanying notes 172-80.
154
President Lincoln’s earliest recorded indictment of slavery came during a speech
about mobocracy on January 27, 1838, before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858: SPEECHES, LETTERS, AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 28 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
155
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James N. Brown (Oct. 18, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED
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blacks were never meant to be excluded from the human rights
156
guarantees of the Declaration.
The Declaration’s recognition that “all men are created equal”
influenced a generation of Republicans, who, like Lincoln, played vital
roles in passing the proposed Thirteenth Amendment through Congress.
They intended the Amendment to protect the self-evident natural rights
to which the Declaration had committed the national government. This
perspective appears repeatedly in the Congressional debates on the
proposed amendment.
A U.S. Representative, who advocated passage of the Amendment,
regarded it as the legal means for ending a variety of injustices connected
to slavery:
What vested rights so high or so sacred as a man’s right to himself,
to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own
industry? Did not our fathers declare that those rights were
inalienable? And if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how
I can another man alienate them without being himself a robber of
157
the vested rights of his brother-man?

Slavery violated principles of the American Revolution that sparked
opposition to British infringement on American liberties. Within this
national history, the Thirteenth Amendment brought the Constitution,
which originally protected the institution of slavery, into harmony with
158
the Declaration of Independence. As Charles Black pointed out: “The
thirteenth amendment had lain latent in the Declaration of
Independence. . . . The generation that abolished slavery made such a
choice, as to the matter wherein the hypocrisy of the Declaration had
seemed most startling. But the Declaration of Independence is still
159
here.”
By passing the Thirteenth Amendment, Radical Republicans,
pursuant to their abolitionist roots, altered the Constitution to reflect the
practical implications of Revolutionary ideology.
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 327 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
156
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 6, 1860), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) (“To us it appears natural
to think that slaves are human beings; men, not property; that some of the things, at least,
stated about men in the Declaration of Independence apply to them as well as to us.”).
157
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865) (Ill. Rep. John F. Farnsworth).
158
W. R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS & RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1867, at 26768 (1963); STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 185-213 (1967) (concerning question of slavery and Constitutional
Convention).
159
Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1986).

1804

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1773

The Thirteenth Amendment provides a method of enforcement for the
protection of those civil liberties that, until the Amendment’s ratification,
had been valued but not implemented. The Amendment allows
Congress to secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness through
160
positive laws.
The Declaration could only provide an inspirational
token for abolitionists and Reconstructionists since it did not end slavery
161
and the Constitution lacked any clear recognition of its principles. The
Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause became the constitutional
vehicle for ending any vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude.
More importantly, from a contemporary perspective, the Amendment
established a constitutional guarantee of freedom. Without the power
granted under the Thirteenth Amendment, Stevens pointed out, the
Constitution protected slavery and the federal government lacked any
162
power to regulate it.
Behind the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision lies a
national commitment to secure personal autonomy as the best path to
civil welfare.
Progressive advocates of the first reconstruction
amendment made an earnest effort to remove impediments to civil
rights. They regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of
restoring the natural rights long denied to blacks, in particular, and wage
earners, in general. According to Radical Republicans, former slaves not
only were freed from bondage, but also gained the right to make
fundamental choices regarding matters affecting their jobs and families.
Congressman M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania expressed the meaning
of liberty for these former slaves in general, rhetorical terms:
What kind of freedom is that which is given by the amendment of
the Constitution, and if it is confined simply to the exemption of the
freedom from sale and barter? Do you give freedom to a man when

160

See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d. Sess. 142 (1865) (Ind. Rep. Godlove S. Orth).
The remark of Alvan Stewart, an antislavery attorney, on the Declaration is
revealing of its limited power to alter the status of slavery. His remarks warrant extensive
reproduction:
161

The young Sovereignty limped up into the temple of nations, with the Declaration
of Independence spread, in her right hand, with a whip and fetter in her left,
followed by a slave, while the blush mantled on her cheek, and revealed the
struggles of her shame; and what she lacked in the sincerity of intent, she
contrived to countervail by a certain impudence of pretence.
Letter from Alvan Stewart to Dr. [Gamaliel] Bailey (Apr. 1842), in WRITINGS & SPEECHES OF
ALVAN STEWART, ON SLAVERY 250-51 (Luther R. Marsh ed., 1860).
162
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1865).
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you allow him to be deprived of those great natural rights to which
163
every man is entitled by nature?

Radical Republicans relied on the Declaration of Independence to
elucidate the proposed amendment. Representative Godlove S. Orth
from Indiana expected the Amendment to “be a practical application of
that self-evident truth” of the Declaration’s decree “‘that [all men] are
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among
164
these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”
The
Amendment’s more progressive advocates made an “earnest and
determined effort” to remove impediments standing in the way of
165
human rights. Francis W. Kellogg, Representative of Michigan, traced
the sources of the proposed amendment both to the Declaration and to
the Constitution’s Preamble, with its requirements that government
166
promote the general welfare and secure liberty. Illinois Representative
Ebon C. Ingersoll, who was elected to the Thirty-Eighth Congress to fill
the vacancy created by the death of legendary abolitionist Owen
Lovejoy, voiced the desire to secure slaves’ “natural” and “inalienable”
167
rights because blacks have the right to “live in a state of freedom.” He
asserted that they have a right to profit from their labors and to enjoy
conjugal happiness without fear of forced separations at the behest of
168
uncompassionate masters.
Representative Thomas T. Davis believed that the framers had
anticipated that slavery would eventually end since they secured civil
169
and religious liberty through the Declaration of Independence.
Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois thought the “old fathers
who made the Constitution . . . believed that slavery was at war with the
170
rights of human nature.”
On the other hand, Representative William
D. Kelley of Pennsylvania thought the “errors” of the founding fathers

163

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865).
165
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1200 (1864).
166
Id. at 2955.
167
Id. at 2990.
168
See id.
169
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865). Likewise, during the Senate debate,
Reverdy Johnson, who had represented one of Dred Scott’s owners, argued that had the
framers known how much sectional strife would result from slavery, they would have
opposed it. The Anti-Slavery Amendment to the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1864, at 1.
170
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (1864).
164
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for compromising with wrongs were being expiated by “blood and
171
agony and death.”
Congressional debates on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment
sometimes explained the specific freedoms it meant to guarantee. Those
debates indicated that the Enforcement Clause grants Congress a broadranging power to construe and protect civil rights in accordance with
American commitments to fundamental liberties.
B.

Insight from Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment

Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment provide insight into the extent
of Congress’s reach under its Section 2 enforcement power. Both the
Senate and the House determined to expand federal constitutional
authority enough to make the national government responsible for
ending infringements on fundamental rights. Congressional debates
shed light on how the Thirteenth Amendment changed the dynamic
between the federal and state governments in the area of civil rights.
Soon after Ohio Representative James M. Ashley introduced the
172
proposed Thirteenth Amendment in Congress, President Lincoln gave
a speech in Baltimore on the uncertain nature of freedom. On April 18,
1864, the President observed:
The world has never had a good definition of liberty, and the
American people, just now, are much in need of one. We all declare
for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same
thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as
he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with
others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please
with other men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two,
not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same
173
name, liberty.

Members of the Thirty-Eighth Congress who debated on passing the
proposed Thirteenth Amendment did much to dispel this paradoxical
vagueness.

171

Id. at 2983.
Ashley introduced the proposal on December 14, 1863, during the 38th Congress,
announcing his intent to submit an amendment “prohibiting slavery, or involuntary
servitude, in all of the States and Territories now owned or which may be hereafter
acquired by the United States.” Id. at 19. In the Senate, John Henderson of Missouri
introduced the proposal on January 13, 1864. Id. at 145.
173
William L. Westermann, Between Slavery & Freedom, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 213, 213
(1945).
172
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Supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment had a principled aim of
securing liberty, even though their arguments were sometimes tempered
174
by political considerations.
Their speeches were often filled with a
penetrating understanding of human rights that seemingly eluded the
175
founding generation with its concessions to slavery.
In retrospect,
Isaac N. Arnold, who had served in Congress during the Civil War,
considered the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment to have been “the
most important in American history. Indeed it would be difficult to find
176
any others so important in the history of the world.”
The
revolutionary constitutional changes that the Thirteenth Amendment
heralded brought into sharp relief the original Constitution’s protections
177
of slavery. Even the Bill of Rights had failed to end that institution. To
others, ending slavery through a constitutional amendment was a logical
extension of the work of the “old fathers who made the Constitution”
because the framers “fought for the rights of human nature, and they
178
believed that slavery was at war with the rights of human nature.”
Debates on an abolition amendment arose at a time when the South’s
secession had left Congress under the leadership of members who
wished to eradicate institutionalized slavery, which they understood to
179
be the origin of the Civil War. The Emancipation Proclamation did not

174
Richard L. Aynes, Refined Incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 289, 298 (1999) (mentioning that congressional debates, on topics such as
Reconstruction, were reported in both Congressional Globe and local newspapers).
175
The original Constitution contains several compromises that the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention of 1787 made to the supporters of slavery: the Three-Fifths
Clause reduced blacks to three-fifths the value of whites for purposes of representation, the
Fugitive Slave Clause prohibited nonslaveholding states from emancipating runaway
slaves and required their return to slaveholders, and the Slave Importation Clause
countenanced the African slave trade to continue until 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3,
partly repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (lapsed); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, affected by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. For a detailed explanation of
this point, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977); Frederick Douglass, The Constitution & Slavery, in 1
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 352 (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1950) (first published in THE NORTH STAR, Mar. 16, 1849); Paul Finkelman, The Color of
Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 971 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992)).
176
ISAAC N. ARNOLD, THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 346 (1887).
177
Representative William D. Kelley, for instance, recognized that the founders had
“compromised with wrong” at the Constitutional Convention. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2983 (1864). Even opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment, like New York
Representative Fernando Wood, saw it as a “change in the fundamental law [and] a
material alteration.” Id. at 2940.
178
Id. at 2978 (Ill. Rep. John F. Farnsworth).
179
Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative & Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9
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adequately deal with the problem. Indeed, congressmen and President
Lincoln recognized that the Proclamation was inadequate to eradicate
slavery since its legal justification rested on the President’s wartime
180
powers and would be ineffectual following the end of conflict.
The
constitutional uncertainties surrounding the Emancipation Proclamation
gave rise to the political resolve to pass a constitutional amendment
181
abolishing slavery.
Sustained debate on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment did not
begin until mid March of 1864 and concluded with its passage on
182
January 31, 1865.
During that period, several congressmen proposed
183
resolutions.
The most ambitious of these was Charles Sumner’s
proposal proving that, “[e]verywhere within the limits of the United
States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons are equal before
184
the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave.”
When the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Lyman Trumbull, reported
the language of the House and Senate’s joint resolution, it lacked
185
Sumner’s proposed wording on equality.
This was a missed

NAT’L B.J. 26, 33 (1951).
180
Ira Berlin, Emancipation & Its Meaning, in UNION & EMANCIPATION: ESSAYS ON
POLITICS & RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 109 (David W. Blight & Brooks D. Simpson eds.,
1997) (discussing President Lincoln’s understanding of limited nature of Emancipation
Proclamation because it was based on his military powers as Commander and Chief).
181
On the decision to strengthen the principles associated with the Emancipation
Proclamation, see DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS & THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 55 (1991); J. G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 372-78, 390-91 (rev. ed. 1963); HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF
LYMAN TRUMBULL 222-23 (1913).
182
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 531 (1865); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1199 (1864).
183
Beside Ashley’s resolution, Radical Representatives James E. Wilson of Iowa and
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Missouri Senator John B. Henderson proposed
varying, but substantively similar, amendment proposals. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21, 145, 1325 (1864). Henderson, who was a Democrat, was himself a slaveowner
when the Civil War began. His support during the Senate debates on the proposed
amendment was nevertheless steadfast. He recognized that slavery had caused the
degradation of blacks’ talents and intellects. See id. at 1465 (“I will not be intimidated by
the fears of negro equality. The negro may possess mental qualities entitling him to a
position beyond our present belief. If so, I shall put no obstacle in the way of his
elevation.”).
184
Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
185
On February 10, 1864, the Committee reported the proposal that became the
Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 553. The interchange involved Senators Sumner, Trumbull,
and Jacob Howard of Michigan. Howard mistakenly thought Sumner’s language to be
“utterly insignificant and meaningless.” Id. at 1482-83, 1488. Sumner withdrew his
proposal since he considered Howard’s views to be based on a sincere commitment to
abolition. Id. at 1488.
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opportunity that required the passage of another amendment, the
186
Fourteenth, which did include an equal protection clause.
Despite their inability to foresee how difficult it would be to secure
187
equality for blacks, the Thirty-Eighth Congress adopted two powerful,
though pithy, sections.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s supporters
expected Section 2 to enable Congress to secure the benefits of national
citizenship, including the freedom to travel, labor, and alienate
188
property.
In retrospect, Representative Thayer said that the
Amendment was meant to benefit freemen with the “great charter of
189
liberty.”
Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson’s perspective that the
proposed amendment would guard the “sacred rights” of whites and
190
blacks was typical among the Amendment’s supporters. Philadelphia
Representative Kelley sought to establish universal liberty that would
191
allow everyone to enjoy the “beneficent republican institutions.”
Blacks were the main victims of slavery, but many Republicans also
192
blamed the institution for degrading all labor, including white labor.

186
Many of the amendment’s supporters seem to have considered the “equality”
wording to be unnecessary since they believed that the very passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment would mean that thereafter “all persons shall be equal under the law,” as
Representative Elijah Ward of New York explained. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177
(1865).
187
Since the Thirteenth Amendment lacked any explicit recognition of equality,
Congressmen who opposed granting blacks equal rights could argue that the Amendment
was never meant to guarantee those rights. Senator Willard Saulsbury, for instance,
claimed during the Thirty-Ninth Congress that the amendment was only meant to affect
blacks in slavery and not to make them or free blacks in the North and South legally equal
to white men. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866).
188
HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMEN’S
RIGHTS, 1861-1866, at 120 (1976).
189
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866).
190
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
191
Id. at 2985.
192
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Representative James Wilson of Iowa,
pointed out that “non-slaveholding whites became alarmed at the bold announcement that
‘slavery is the natural and normal condition of the laboring man, whether white or black,’
seeing therein the commencement of an effort intended to result in the enslavement of
labor instead of the mere enslavement of the African race.” Id. at 1202. Wilson was
referring to an editorial from a South Carolina newspaper. The full text bode even more
ominously for white laborers:

The great evil of Northern free society is that it is burdened with a servile class of
mechanics and laborers unfit for self-government, and yet clothed with the attributes
and powers of citizens. Master and slave is a relation as necessary as that of
parent and child; and the Northern States will yet have to introduce it. Slavery is
the natural and normal condition of laboring men whether white or black.
Joseph G. Rayback, The American Workingman & the Antislavery Crusade, 3 J. ECON. HIST. 152,
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Representative Arnold believed that liberty and equality for all
193
citizens would be the Amendment’s “great cornerstone.”
The
Amendment was meant to transform American society by guaranteeing
civil liberty to all racial and economic strata of the population. Everyone,
regardless of race, occupation, or resources, was to be an equal before the
194
law.
Radical Republican Ingersoll proclaimed that the Thirteenth
195
Amendment would secure natural and God-given rights.
Although
Ingersoll’s statement was vague, as were those of many participants in
the debates, it expressed an expectation that future congressional policies
on behalf of the general welfare would be predicated on the country’s
foundational principles. Forced servitude itself was a violation of
freedom to “enjoy God’s free sunshine” and the right to reap the benefits
196
of labor. Poor white laborers, much like their black bretheren, Ingersoll
believed, would benefit from emancipation since slavery kept them in
ignorance, poverty, and degradation. He and other Congressmen thus
conceived of slavery in broad terms, much as Revolutionaries had. The
Thirteenth Amendment was to end the individual- and state-sponsored

162 (1943). Supporters of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment, like Representative Francis
W. Kellogg of Michigan, were well aware that the “leading men of the South” believed that
“capitalists of the country should own the laborers, whether white or black.” CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864).
The most popular proslavery advocate of this view was George Fitzhugh who
thought that a northern worker “who contracts to serve for a term of days, months, or
years, is, for such term, the property of his employer.” GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL!
OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 342 (1857). Historian Eugene D. Genovese has pointed out
the classist logic of this point: “The notion that slavery was a proper social system for all
labor, not merely for black labor, did not arise as a last-minute rationalization; it grew
steadily as part of the growing self-awareness of the planter class.” EUGENE D. GENOVESE,
THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 130 (1969); see also James L. Huston, A Political
Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of Protectionist Labor Doctrines, 70 J. AM.
HIST. 35, 38 (1983) (“Southerners eagerly grasped the conclusion of English economists that
all free labor was destined to live a beggarly existence and wielded this prediction like a
club against northern defamers of the peculiar institution . . . .”); Russell B. Nye, The Slave
Power Conspiracy, 1830-1860, in THE ABOLITIONISTS: REFORMERS OR FANATICS? 107, 110-11
(Richard O. Curry ed., 1965) (explaining abolitionist and Republican dissemination of
information on southern perception that white labor was form of slavery).
193
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989 (1864).
194
Representative James F. Wilson envisioned the new Republic to be a place where
persons of humble stations would be legally equal to kings and princes. Id. at 1319.
Radicals hoped the Thirteenth Amendment would improve labor conditions for whites and
blacks. The Republican party regarded efforts on behalf of a free white labor force to be
central for equality. “Free labor,” as Eric Foner has pointed out, meant not being subject
“to the coercions of slavery and enjoying the opportunity for physical mobility and social
advancement.” Foner, supra note 20, at 453.
195
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864).
196
Id.
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despotism abolitionists had analogized to the oppressiveness the
197
country’s framers fought against.
A civil transformation should have occurred at the time of the
Revolution, but the pragmatics of nation-making had crippled reform.
The failure of conviction had allowed local biases to trump individual
rights. Only the national government could achieve the broad-ranging
reform. The Thirty-Eighth Congress determined to supersede sectional
sensitivities with a legislative power over racialist and classist behavior.
To only free slaves by amendment and leave them at the mercy of state
prejudices was likely to create an underclass. Federal power would need
to extend beyond abolition, to matters affecting the daily lives of
individuals. If “freedom” was to mean nothing more than liberation
from shackles, Representative and future president James A. Garfield
pointed out in 1865, then it would be “a bitter mockery” and “a cruel
198
delusion.”
For freedom to be a triumphant end of slavery, the
Thirteenth Amendment needed to provide government with the power
to end all the concomitant detriments associated with the institution.
Debates on the Amendment indicate that Congress believed that
abolition would guarantee newly freed blacks and all American citizens
a variety of rights. Freedom would make blacks active participants in a
political system that whites had dominated since the country’s
199
founding.

197

Id.
James A. Garfield, Oration Delivered at Ravenna, Ohio, July 4, 1865, in 1 THE WORKS OF
JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882).
199
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1865). Near the end of the Congressional
debate, Representative John R. McBride of Oregon addressed fears that emancipation
would mean blacks would have political franchise. He thought that after liberation the
“rights and status of the negro [should] settle themselves as they will and must upon their
own just basis. If, as a race, they shall prove themselves worthy of elective . . . right; they
will demand and they will win it, and they ought to have it.” Id. While this statement is
somewhat equivocal and blacks were not granted franchise until the Fifteenth Amendment
was ratified, McBride envisioned the Thirteenth Amendment to be an empowerment for
further political accomplishments. Furthermore, Congress passed the Reconstruction Act
of 1867 three years before the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified. That Act required
Southern states to grant blacks suffrage rights. Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat.
428, 249; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
277 (1989); Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial &
Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT 21, 21 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). Such bold
reconstruction power indicates that McBride was not the only legislator who thought the
Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to secure political rights. The Fifteenth
Amendment put this power, with its limited qualification of racial protection, beyond
legislative doubt.
198
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Freedom also had political implications since Revolutionaries had
denounced British despotism for excluding them from political
participation. Prohibiting blacks and other disenfranchised groups from
holding political office violated the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, Representative Stevens asserted, because the government
of the United States was never meant to be under the sovereignty of
200
races, dynasties, and families. The equal right to govern was innate to
201
everyone “no matter what [their] shape or color.”
The Declaration recognized the inalienable nature of civil and religious
202
liberty and their centrality in founding a new country.
The Thirteenth
Amendment was to grant the missing federal enforcement power to
203
guarantee that birthright.
Proponents assumed that slavery violated
the fundamental principles of the social contract, which they regarded as
binding in spite of the constitutional protections of slavery. For them,
the Preamble superseded the legal sanctions of slavery.
Radicals incorporated the natural truths of the Declaration and the
204
Preamble into the Amendment.
Many in the Thirty-Eighth Congress
recognized that laws that barred blacks from engaging in ordinary
business, entering into contracts, and acquiring an education
205
compromised the country’s founding principles.
The Thirteenth
Amendment, therefore, did much more than simply sever the de facto
206
and de jure connections that bound slaves to their masters.
As
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont put it, passing the

200

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1864).
Id.
202
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (Ind. Rep. Godlove S. Orth).
203
See id.
204
Id. at 222 (Mass. Rep. George S. Boutwell).
205
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865).
206
In spite of the congressmen’s idealistic flourishes, many of them did not support
radical bills, such as Thaddeus Stevens’s proposal of reparations. See id. Stevens’s
reparation recommendation was commonly referred to as “Forty Acres and a Mule.” See
Lance S. Hamilton, Note, Ethnomiseducationalization: A Legal Challenge, 100 YALE L.J. 1815,
1820 n.19 (1991). Stevens argued that the United States should make reparations to the
former slaves by providing them with homesteads and creating laws to protect their
property rights. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865). Under President Andrew
Johnson’s Proclamation of Amnesty, former slaveholders reclaimed the plots of land that
had been given to blacks by personnel from the Union Army and Freedmen’s Bureau. See
Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 n.20 (1985). Representative
George W. Julian was another radical supporter of land confiscation as a means of
punishing the South and allaying the suffering of the newly freed through land
distribution. WILLIAM L. RICHTER, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1877, at 240-41
(1996).
201
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Amendment assured that at the end of the War, “the goddess of Liberty.
. . . may look north and south, east and west, upon a free nation
207
untarnished by aught inconsistent with freedom.”
Some of the ideals expressed during the congressional debates were
visionary and not realized even after the Thirteenth Amendment’s
ratification. Senator James Harlan of Iowa, during the Senate debate of
1864, exposed the suppression arising from the South’s peculiar
institution of slavery. He was the first to coin the term “incidents of
servitude,” which the Court has since adopted for identifying the range
208
of oppressions the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits.
Harlan listed
interference with parental and marital relationships, the prohibition
against participation on juries, restrictions against black property
ownership, interference with the right to testify in court, and the
209
suppression of free speech as examples of the incidents of servitude.
210
Senator Henry Wilson, who had opposed slavery from his youth,
believed that the abolition of those incidents would renew the United
States’s commitment to its creed of liberty:
If this amendment shall be incorporated by the will of the nation
into the Constitution of the United States, it will obliterate the last
lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading,
and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was
and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it, from the face of
the nation it was scarred with moral desolation, from the bosom of
the country it has reddened with the blood and strewn with the
graves of patriotism. The incorporation of this amendment into the
organic law of the nation will make impossible forevermore the
reappearing of the discarded slave system, and the returning of the
211
despotism of the slavemasters’ domination.

207

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1865).
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864); see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (“[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery — its ‘burdens and disabilities’ —
included restrations upon ‘those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,
namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens.’” (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883))).
209
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
210
For Senator Wilson’s longstanding commitment to ending slavery, see 2 ALLAN
NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 412-13 (1947) and WILLIAM R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS
1865-1867, at 83-84 (1963).
211
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864) (emphasis added).
208
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In place of slavery’s chains, federal law would respect natural rights by
212
protecting family interests. Enforced ignorance, too, was a hallmark of
213
involuntary servitude, and education was essential to dispelling it.
A consensus grew during the congressional debates that the
Thirteenth Amendment would empower Congress to pass legislation
directed at any arbitrary practice associated with involuntary servitude
214
and slavery.
The rupture between the Confederacy and the Union
empowered a federalist-minded group of legislators to make America’s
215
founding assertions enforceable.
During the Civil War, many
Republicans adopted radical abolitionist principles about the federal
government’s obligation to eradicate slavery, and many of the opponents
of the Thirteenth Amendment decried this republican brand of
216
federalism. Even President Lincoln, who believed slavery was “a total
violation” of the Declaration of Independence, initially held to a
217
gradualist, state-by-state approach.
His views changed only during
the Civil War when he realized that southern states would not abandon
218
their expansionist ambitions.
Reconstruction, which began to take shape after Lincoln’s death,
provided an opportunity to address human rights violations through
federal legislation.
During that period, Congress passed three
amendments, beginning with the Thirteenth, which granted the national
government a degree of power to protect civil rights that it had never
219
possessed before. During the Reconstruction Congress’s brief hold on

212
Id. Senator Jacob M. Howard, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee that
reported the language of the Thirteenth Amendment, likewise believed that the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to protect “the ordinary rights of a freeman,”
including rights appertaining to the family. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 503-04
(1866).
213
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864). Numerous antebellum southern
states made it a criminal offence to educate blacks. James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, &
Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 487 (1999).
214
See RICHARDS, supra note 151, at 97-98.
215
The congressional leadership, for a time, was populated with Radical Republicans
who sought to gain equal status for blacks. See infra text accompanying notes 172-90.
216
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864) (stating that enforcing
federal protections of civil rights “shall have any effect at all, must be fatal; fatal to the very
life of the Constitution, fatal to the fundamental principles of the Republic, the right, the
irrepressible right of the States to domestic Government”).
217
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas (Oct. 16,
1854), in THE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 208-10 (Arthur B. Lapsley ed., 1905).
218
Id.
219
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-1, at 1293 (3d ed. 2000)
(“The Civil War, and the [Reconstruction] amendments that were its fairly immediate
legacy . . . place the issue of personal rights — and the necessity of their direct protection
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power, it passed legislation guaranteeing equal access to the courts, the
right to purchase and convey real and personal property, and the power
220
to enter and enforce contracts.
A national commitment to individual liberties and civil welfare is the
basis of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause
authority. Radical advocates of the first Reconstruction Amendment
granted federal legislators the power to decide what liberties are
essential to a fulfilling life, debated the means of securing those
fundamental interests, and then passed laws punishing their
abridgement.
Freedom without the “great natural rights,” as
221
Congressman Thayer called them, would be chimerical.
Radicals
overlooked the stalemates that could result from diverging views on
natural rights and only came to understand the need for additional
constitutional guarantees after repeated civil rights clashes with
President Andrew Johnson. The Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
fill the missing specificity. Despite the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad
language, contemporaries understood that it dramatically shifted power
222
away from the states to the federal government.
Congressmen who worked against the proposed Thirteenth
Amendment realized that Republicans aimed to do more than simply
end forced labor. The proposal’s opponents feared that abolishing
slavery would be tantamount to granting blacks political and civic rights,
223
like the right to vote and to be part of a jury. A memorable exchange
between Representatives William D. Kelley and John D. Stiles, both from
Pennsylvania, indicates that the advocates on both sides of the argument
realized the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to obtain equal
citizenship rights for blacks, even though the Amendment never
explicitly mentioned them. Stiles inquired whether the Amendment

against state interference — squarely within the cognizance of the federal Constitution and
the federal judiciary.”).
220
In relevant part, see Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000)).
221
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (Mar. 2, 1866).
222
HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 386-438
(1982) (analyzing links between Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); TENBROEK, supra
note 128, at 196-97 (finding that Thirteenth Amendment’s framers regarded as “doing the
whole job — not merely cutting loose the fetters which bound the physical person of the
slave, but restoring to him his natural, inalienable, and civil rights, or, in other words,
guaranteeing to him the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”).
223
Ohio Representative Chilton A. White made this point cautiously through a series of
questions designed to raise concerns about passing the proposed amendment. CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1865).
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224

would favor racial equality between the races.
Kelley responded that
blacks should not be excluded from political power because of arbitrary,
225
The concern of losing white control over the
racialist views.
government was also on Representative Chilton A. White’s mind:
Do you propose to enfranchise them, and make them “before the
law,” . . . the equals of the white man; give them the right to
suffrage; the right to hold office; the right to sit on juries? Do you
intend . . . to make this a mongrel Government, instead of a white
226
man’s Government?

Section 2 of the proposed amendment, containing the Enforcement
Clause, gave the greatest pause to Congressmen who opposed passing it
227
onto the states for ratification. The section, as its drafters understood it
228
and as the Supreme Court later interpreted it, went far beyond merely
granting Congress the power to enact legislation against the exploitation
of slaves. It went to the core purposes of government and used the
broad language of liberty that the country’s founding generation had
also adopted. Ohio Senator John Sherman, who went on to be Secretary
of the Treasury under Rutherford B. Hayes and, later, Secretary of State
under President William McKinley, considered the Thirteenth
Amendment to be a “guarantee of liberty” and its second section “an
express grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate
229
legislation.”
Unless the rights of citizens everywhere were the same,
230
“freedom” was meaningless.
Schuyler Colfax, the incoming Speaker of the House for the ThirtyNinth Congress, opened the session in 1865 with a statement on
Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment. “[I]t is yours,”
Colfax told the House,

224

Id. at 291.
Id.
226
Id. at 216; see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2982 (1864) (protesting that
Radical Republicans meant to make “Black free men . . . American citizens”).
227
See Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative & Judicial History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 9 NAT’L B.J. 26, 45-46 (1951) (quoting concerns about breadth of congressional
power under second section of Thirteenth Amendment voiced by delegate from
Mississippi and provisional governor of South Carolina).
228
On the Court’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, see infra Part IV.
229
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865).
230
See id. (“Now unless a man may be free without the right to sue and be sued, to
plead and be impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and to testify in a court of justice,
then Congress has the power by the express terms of this amendment, to secure all these
rights. To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not able to assert and maintain his right, in
a court of justice, is a negation of terms.”).
225
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to mature and enact legislation which . . . shall establish [state
governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will
guarantee all necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what
our Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the
chief object of government-protection of all men in their inalienable
231
rights.

His ideas reflected the dominant congressional view on the Thirteenth
Amendment’s scope prior to the beginning of debates on the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Trumbull, in 1866, about a year after
the states ratified the Amendment, reiterated that Section 2 gives
Congress the power to adopt any legislation necessary for achieving
232
liberty.
He regarded the ambit of congressional power to extend to
ending interference with commercial transactions, ownership rights, and
233
educational enrollment.
Both the adversaries and supporters of abolition relied on the
founding fathers to bolster their respective arguments. Opponents of the
proposed amendment charged that its adoption was an impermissible
assertion of power since the amendment would materially alter
234
government as the founders had envisioned it. The founders, Senator
Willard Saulsbury of Delaware insisted, wanted to preserve the right to
slave property, not to give the Union “control over the domestic relations
existing in the States, [and] not to regulate the right and title to property
235
in the States.”
Representative Kellogg asserted, to the contrary, that the Thirteenth
Amendment was meant to promote the general welfare — the primary
236
object of the Constitution. Congressman Morris of New York held the
contractarian perspective that the Constitution could be amended to
prohibit slavery since “each member upon entering society covenants to
yield his particular to the general good, and to so comport as to infract
none of the rights of others, and also not to incapacitate himself for the
237
discharge of the duties growing out of the social relations.”
Another
231

Id. at 5.
Id. at 322. Senator Trumbull’s view, however, can in no way be characterized as
equalitarian since, on the same page, this moderate Republican proclaimed that laws
prohibiting intermarriage were equitable and constitutional. See id.
233
Id.
234
See, e.g., id. at 2940 (“It will be, if adopted, a change in the fundamental law — a
material alteration in the Constitution of the United States as formed by the founders of the
Government.”).
235
Id. at 1366.
236
Id. at 2955.
237
Id. at 2614.
232
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Republican believed slavery was an evil the founders accepted but
“regarded as temporary in its character and as tolerable only by reason
238
of the exigencies of the hour.”
C.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866

Soon after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cases
interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which Congress passed
pursuant to its enforcement authority, began to proceed through the
239
courts.
Surveying the legislative history of this statute is critical for
evaluating the Supreme Court cases that interpreted it. During debates
preceding the Act’s passage, congressmen continued to rely on the same
radical abolitionist conception of fundamental rights that they had relied
on during the years prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth
240
Amendment.
They regarded the protection of civil rights to be a
primary purpose of government.
The Act reflected Congress’s
commitment to enacting legal protections for blacks that would do more
than merely unshackle them from their masters’ control. It explicitly
241
prohibited violations against civil rights, such as the right to contract.
Furthermore, Congress meant to make freedom universal. The Act was
primarily intended to end injustices against blacks, but it likewise
242
protected the rights of all citizens, regardless of their race.
Senator
Sherman argued that real liberty was more than mere emancipation;
therefore, a law passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment would
have to secure citizens’ rights to testify at trial, to own property, to profit
from their labor, to raise a family, to acquire an education, and to
243
travel.
238

CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865).
The Reconstruction Congress enacted four statutes pursuant to its Thirteenth
Amendment power, even before the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546; Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385
(expanding scope of habeas corpus statutes); Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50
(1866); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
240
See TENBROEK, supra note 128, at 157-58.
241
The Act concerns a variety of contract, property, and procedural rights. Violators
were subject to imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of no more than $1000. Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31.
242
Senator Lyman Trumbull, who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
stated that the Civil Rights Bill was intended to “guaranty to every person of every color
the same civil rights.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866).
243
Id. at 42. Senator Howard held a similarly broad construction of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom, considering: “[W]hat are the attributes of a freeman
according to the universal understanding of the American people? Is a freeman to be
deprived of the right of acquiring property, of the right of having a family, a wife, children,
239
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The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment changed the
federalist dynamic between states and the federal government, making
Congress, rather than state legislatures, the supreme protector of civil
liberties. Senator Wilson regarded civil rights to be “the true office of
Government to protect” and believed that their possession “by the
citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect
244
them.”
Senator Sherman argued that the power to enact civil rights
legislation was even more explicitly found in the second section of the
Thirteenth Amendment: “[It] is not only a guarantee of liberty to every
inhabitant of the United States, but an express grant of power to
245
Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate legislation.”
The
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the enforcement authority it
246
needed to authorize enactments on behalf of the nation’s citizenry.
The congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil
Rights Act of 1866, along with the handful of Supreme Court opinions on
Reconstruction era statutes, provide the best sources for expanding on
the Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority. These sources
indicate that the Amendment grants Congress the power to put into
effect the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution. What is needed to achieve progress in civil
rights is a clarification of the Thirteenth Amendment’s notion of
nationally guaranteed liberal equality.
IV.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The new standards that the Supreme Court has placed on the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment make it more
difficult for Congress to rely on them for the passage of civil rights
legislation. The Thirteenth Amendment is an alternative constitutional
grant of authority for regulating discrimination against identifiable
groups. The Thirteenth Amendment, as Part V will point out, can
sometimes better protect against unequal treatment because, unlike the

home? What definition will you attach to the word ‘freeman’ that does not include these
ideas?” Id. at 504. Any lesser guarantee of freedom, Howard asserted, would be worse
than the bondage from which blacks emerged. Id.
244
Id. at 1118, 1119.
245
Id. at 41.
246
Robert J. Kaczorowski has similarly pointed out that Dred Scott made the natural
rights theory of the Declaration unenforceable without the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War & Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
863, 894-95 (1986).
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Fourteenth Amendment, it has no state action requirement making
private discrimination actionable. Further, unlike the Commerce Clause,
it is not an economic constitutional provision, but one established on
revolutionary and abolitionist notions of liberty and equality.
The Court’s earliest interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment
prevented the full implementation of abolitionist ideals, and only the
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s led to an understanding of liberty
approaching that of the Radical Republicans. Finally, the Warren and
Burger Courts’ Thirteenth Amendment holdings, which the Rehnquist
Court did not truncate, embraced a broad understanding of Congress’s
enforcement power.
A.

Early Judicial Interpretation

The earliest interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 boded well
for ending practices associated with slavery and involuntary servitude.
247
was the first federal decision on the
United States v. Rhodes
constitutionality of the Act. It asserted that the abolition amendment
“consecrates the entire territory of the republic to freedom, as well as to
248
249
free institutions.”
Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, presiding
over the case as a designated circuit court justice, held that the Thirteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to pass the Act and federal courts to
adjudicate cases arising out of it. The white defendant was charged with
committing burglary against Nancy Talbot, “a citizen of the United
250
States of, the African race.” The case was litigated in a federal district
court because Kentucky law forbade blacks from testifying against
251
whites in state courts. In dictum, Justice Swayne posited that without
congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, “simple
252
abolition . . . would have been a phantom of delusion.”
The
Amendment reversed the policy of the original Constitution and gave
247

United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
Id. at 793.
249
Justice Swayne was an established abolitionist even before the Civil War; at one time
he and his wife freed slaves they received by marriage. JOSEPH FLETCHER BRENNAN, 1 THE
(OHIO) BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA AND PORTRAIT GALLERY 101 (1880). As an attorney,
Justice Swayne had even represented several fugitive slaves. William Gillette, Noah H.
Swayne, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES &
MAJOR OPINIONS 990 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980). His most famous
representation came in the Oberlin rescue cases, involving the Fugitive Slave Law. See Ex
parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); Ex parte Bushnell, 8 Ohio St. 599 (1858).
250
Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 786.
251
Id. at 785.
252
Id. at 794.
248
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253

Congress authority to prohibit discrimination.
The Supreme Court ruled very differently in Blyew v. United States,
which commenced a judicial trend that downplayed the Thirteenth
Amendment’s pertinence to Revolutionary and abolitionist notions of
254
freedom. It was the first blow to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment
for ending centuries of racial intolerance. The two defendants were
indicted in 1868, when Kentucky still forbade black witnesses from
255
testifying against whites.
Both the oral and physical evidence at trial showed that in one night
John Blyew and George Kennard, two white men, murdered three
256
generations of a black family.
The case had been removed to district
257
court pursuant to section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That section
permitted removal “of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons
who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of
258
the State, or locality where they may be.”
The U.S. Solicitor General
argued that the right to testify protected persons and property and was a
freedom the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to secure for
259
all citizens regardless of their race.
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the defendant’s assertion that
the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s removal provision was unconstitutional,
instead deciding Blyew on a technical, statutory ground. The Court held
that the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the
murder had not directly affected the two surviving witnesses to the
260
crime who were both black.
All those who had been affected by the
crime, according to the Court’s interpretation of section 3 of the Act, had
been murdered. The Court considered it irrelevant that even if the black
victims had survived the assault, they could not have testified in a
261
Kentucky court against the white defendants.
Litigation could not
253
Id. (“The amendment reversed and annulled the original policy of the constitution,
which left it to each state to decide exclusively for itself whether slavery should or should
not exist as a local institution, and what disabilities should attach to those of the servile
race within its limits.”).
254
Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 590-95 (1871).
255
Id. at 581 (citing 1860 Ky. Acts 470). The law only permitted blacks and Native
Americans to act as “competent witnesses” in civil suits to which the only parties were
blacks or Native Americans. Id.
256
Murder: Particulars of the Late Tragedy in Lewis County, LOUISVILLE DAILY J., Sept. 9,
1868, at 3.
257
See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 597 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
258
See id.
259
Id. at 589.
260
Id. at 593.
261
Id. at 593-94.

1822

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:1773

affect the murder victims and, therefore, the Court reversed the
defendants’ federal convictions without even remanding the case.
Justice Joseph Bradley, dissenting with Justice Swayne, criticizedboth
the majority’s “narrow” reading of the Civil Rights Act and its disregard
262
for the liberal ideals surrounding the statute’s passage. Justice Bradley
argued that Congress broadly intended to prevent wanton, racist
263
conduct from being committed against the black community.
The
Thirteenth Amendment attempted to “do away with the incidents and
consequences of slavery” and to replace them with “civil liberty and
264
equality.”
His dissent further concluded that the Amendment’s
primary aim was to instate blacks to the “full enjoyment” of civil
265
rights.
He also recognized that the majority opinion legitimized
Kentucky’s practice of prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites;
266
thereby, the state branded all blacks “with a badge of slavery.”
B.

Segregationist Decisions

While Blyew turned on a procedural matter, the Civil Rights Cases
267
It drew the country back to
initiated a substantive period of decline.
countenancing intolerance for the sake of national tranquility, much like
the founding generation had decided to countenance slavery despite its
eloquent denounciation of despotism.
The abolitionist forces in
Congress had succeeded in making remarkable change to the
Constitution, but the Supreme Court found a way of interpreting the
instrument according to the views of its opponents in the Thirty-Eighth
268
Congress.
Justice Bradley, who wrote for the majority, qualified his
earlier dissent in Blyew, essentially abandoning the Radical
Reconstructionist project to animate the Declaration of Independence’s
269
statement of equal freedom.

262

See id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 595.
264
See id. at 601.
265
See id.
266
See id. at 599.
267
See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
268
Cf. Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congress, 34
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 315, 316 (2000) (arguing that in Slaughterhouse Cases, forerunner to Civil
Rights Cases, “the Supreme Court adopted crucial elements of the Northern Democratic
narrative, even though the Democrats were the legislative losers”).
269
See generally John Anthony Scott, Justice Bradley’s Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth
Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552
(1971) (analyzing Justice Bradley’s change of jurisprudence).
263
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The Civil Rights Cases evaluated the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
270
Act of 1875, the Reconstruction Congress’s last major piece of civil
271
rights legislation. By the time the case came before the Supreme Court
in 1883, Reconstruction had ground to a halt despite the many remaining
institutions and practices that resembled involuntary servitude. The
country had failed to provide the protections of fundamental rights that
abolitionists had advocated. Among the most racialist institutions
designed to retain the burdens of slavery were segregation, peonage, the
use of adhesion contracts for sharecropping, and the convict lease
272
system.
The Civil Rights Cases concerned five joint cases from various parts of
273
274
the country.
The first four were reviews of criminal prosecutions.
Two of the defendants had been charged with denying blacks access to
an inn or hotel, a third with prohibiting a black individual access to the
dress circle of a theater in San Francisco, and another with refusing
275
access to a New York opera house. The fifth case was a civil case from
Tennessee about a railroad company whose conductor denied a black
276
woman access to “ride in the ladies’ car.” Attorneys for four of the five
defendants did not even bother coming to argue the cases before the
277
Court. The Court nevertheless handed their clients a favorable ruling
278
rooted in the emerging national consensus against civil rights reform.

270
The full name of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was, “An act to protect all citizens in
their civil and legal rights.” Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (repealed 1883).
271
Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
22 (1995) (discussing debate about Reconstruction that arose in passing Civil Rights Act of
1875). Concerning Sumner’s centrality in securing passage of the Act, see ERIC FONER, A
SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 226 (1990); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST
LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP 16, 20-21 (2d ed. 1995). On the role of
President Ulysses Grant in the controversy, see WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, ULYSSES S. GRANT,
POLITICIAN 368-71 (1935).
272
One author recently found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, as many as
one-third of all sharecropping farmers “were being held against their will in 1900.”
JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED 107 (1992). On the convict lease system, see DAVID
OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY (1996); see also ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF
FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996); KARIN
A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH REBELLION: THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE
TENNESSEE COAL FIELDS, 1871-1896 (1998).
273
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
274
Id. at 4.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 4-5.
277
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES & THE NEGRO 137-38 (1966).
278
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25-26.
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The decision had far-ranging implications on congressional Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The effects have been
so long lasting that two recent Supreme Court opinions relied on the
Civil Rights Cases’ holding to diminish congressional civil rights
279
powers.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress had overstepped
its Fourteenth Amendment power when it prohibited private place of
280
accommodation discrimination.
The Court, therefore, found the first
two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional. In the
unreconstructed South, the idea that states would regulate private
discrimination was farfetched. Justice Bradley made an artificial
dichotomy, although one that was common in post-Reconstruction
281
United States, between civil rights and social rights.
It was this same
dichotomy that Senator Sumner, who was the Act’s main supporter, had
282
said was raised at every stage of civil rights reform.
It went hand in
hand, he said, with the “vain” argument that “there is no denial of Equal
283
Rights when this separation is enforced.”
Justice Bradley was unable
to see through the artificiality of rejecting integration as a form of social
equality. In the Civil Rights Cases, he held that the Fourteenth
Amendment covered economic rights such as making contracts and
leasing land, but not social rights, which pertained to using public
284
accommodations. Thus, as Angela P. Harris pointed out: “The Court
had curtailed the power to protect American citizens against racial
285
domination in the name of federalism.”

279
United States v. Morrison relied on the Civil Rights Cases for the proposition that
Congress can only prohibit state actions through its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000); see also City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997); Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, &
Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1333-34 (2003) (stating that the
current Court continues to follow Civil Rights Cases holding on restraints of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
280
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17-19 (“This is not corrective legislation; it is primary
and direct; it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of
admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and
displaces state legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.”).
281
Id. at 22.
282
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382-83 (1872).
283
Id.
284
James W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings & Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities, & Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 160-61 (2003) (explaining
distinction made during mid-nineteenth century between social, civil, and political rights).
285
Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness & Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1961 (2000).

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1825

The only member of the Court who disagreed with the majority was
286
Justice John Marshall Harlan.
His view of congressional enforcement
power was analogous to Radical Republican principles of
Reconstruction. His robust understanding of liberty was compatible
with abolitionist efforts to integrate the country. The fifth section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote in dissent, enabled
Congress to enact any “appropriate legislation” to prohibit states,
287
individuals, and corporations from discriminating on account of race.
Justice Harlan determined that neither states nor licensed businesses
could arbitrarily curtail inalienable rights intrinsic to national
citizenship. In his mind, citizens could not be deprived of “rights
inhering in a state of freedom” for which all generations, from the
288
country’s founding, had struggled.
The plaintiffs also brought the Civil Rights Cases pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s holding was the first
substantive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
liberty. The Court recognized that the Amendment went farther than
289
simply releasing slaves from their masters’ control.
In fact, Justice
Bradley reiterated his conviction that the Thirteenth Amendment
granted Congress the power to pass “all necessary and proper laws for
the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and
290
incidents.”
Justice Bradley even conceded that the Thirteenth
291
Amendment prohibited state and private violations.
However, he
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that public accommodation discrimination
292
was a vestige of servitude.
As in the Fourteenth Amendment part of its opinion, the Court again
differentiated between social rights and the “fundamental rights which
293
appertain to the essence of citizenship.”
The ruling thereby limited
286

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 32.
288
According to Justice Harlan, the majority’s opinion so “construed” the “state of
freedom . . . belonging to American citizenship” as to “defeat the ends the people desired to
accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which they supposed they had
accomplished by changes in their fundamental law.” Id. at 33 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
289
See id. at 20 (majority opinion).
290
Id. at 20-21.
291
See id. at 20.
292
Id. at 25.
293
Id. at 22. Justice Bradley went on to say that the Thirteenth Amendment “simply
abolished slavery” while the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibited the states from abridging
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Id. at 23. His conclusions
deviate from his dissent to Blyew v. United States, in which he recognized Congress’s power
to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicate that
287
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congressional Thirteenth Amendment power to the protection of civil
rights. Federal legislation could only end practices directly related to
institutional slavery, including impediments to black court testimony
294
and property ownership.
Based on this line of reasoning, the Court
held that Congress had overreached its Thirteenth Amendment
authority when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to prohibit social
295
discrimination.
Justice Bradley’s minimization of the extent to which a public carrier
can infringe on civil liberties through exclusionary social practices left
virtually no recourse against segregation. Social discrimination limited
the plaintiffs’ ability to travel comfortably, enjoy an opera, reserve a
room at an inn, or watch a play. Such bigotry degraded victims and
marked them with a badge of inferiority. Social exclusion deprived
blacks of the ability to exercise preferences, while perpetuating a white
supremacism intrinsically linked to slavery. Their lot remained even
worse than that of the Revolutionaries who had analogized British
despotism to enslavement. Fifty years after William Lloyd Garrison had
296
published the Liberator, which enervated the abolitionist movement,
the country remained unwilling to recognize black’s claims to freedom.
The Court’s holding in the Civil Rights Cases showed a callousness
toward the private and public impediments that prevented blacks, even
after the end of slavery, from enjoying the freedom of citizenship. Justice
Bradley’s dismissive opinion furthered the social tensions that the
Radical Republicans expected Congress would end through the
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. Homegrown militias
and private business owners who refused to provide blacks with goods
and services were now protected by state indifference or outright

congressmen regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a conduit of equal rights legislation.
See George A. Schell, Note, Open Housing: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. & Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (1969) (discussing courts’ differentiation
between social and civil rights).
294
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
295
Justice Bradley put this point in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he
will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or
admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business.
Id. at 24-25.
296
HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE:
SLAVERY (1998).

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON & THE ABOLITION OF

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1827

297

support for their practices.
In dissent, Justice Harlan understood the Court to be countenancing
298
The majority’s opinion, he
state-sponsored abridgements of freedom.
argued, was “narrow and artificial” and inimical to the “substance and
299
spirit” of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Justice Harlan understood that
since the myth of black inferiority was integral to maintaining slavery,
the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom required the federal
government to pass laws punishing the abridgment of freedom,
300
especially when that abridgment was based on racism. This principle,
for Justice Harlan, carried a practical implication:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect
that people against the deprivation, on account of their race, of any
civil rights enjoyed by other freemen in the same state; and such
legislation may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon
states, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield
301
power and authority under the state.

While Justice Harlan saw no need to dispute Justice Bradley’s assertion
that Congress lacked authority over social rights, he considered the use
of public accommodations to be intrinsic to civil life and, therefore,
297
See id. at 25. Justice Bradley explicitly argued that equal access to public amenities is
unconnected to the enjoyment of fundamental rights:

There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition
of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty, and property the same
as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of
their personal status as freemen because they were not admitted to all the
privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to
discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public
conveyances, and places of amusement.
Id.
298
299
300

See id. at 53-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 26.
See id. at 36.
I do hold that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the moving
or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that institution
rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their
freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all
discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights
as belong to freemen of other races.

Id.
301

Id.
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302

amenable to regulation.
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Thirteenth Amendment fell into virtual
disuse. Indeed, the Court continued to chip away at the sparse
legislation Congress managed to pass prior to the collapse of
Reconstruction. Following the Civil Rights Cases, the Court maintained
303
the distinction between social and civil rights in Plessy v. Ferguson.
This step revealed a judicial aversion to abolitionist notions of freedom
304
and equality. In finding that separate public accommodations did not
violate the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court quoted the Civil Rights
Cases for the proposition that the end of slavery did not require anyone
305
to deal socially with other races in “matters of intercourse or business.”
Taking a literalist approach to slavery, Plessy attacked the assumption
that enforced separation of the two races stamped African Americans
306
with a badge of inferiority. Justice Henry Brown’s narrow construction
of “slavery” was far removed from the broad Revolutionary notions of
307
freedom, regarding the term as strictly a matter of forced labor.
He
ignored the American Revolutionary tradition, which abolitionists and
Radical Republicans had adopted, that understood real freedom to mean
far more than simply being able to choose an employer. It implicated a
right to participate in the life of the community, especially in political
matters, which segregation made virtually inaccessible to blacks.
As he did in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan wrote the dissent to
Plessy. He regarded the right of persons to travel by rail, unimpeded by
308
racial limitations, to be inherent in the concept of liberty.
His
302
303
304

See id. at 56.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See id. at 551-52.
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary
consent of individuals. . . . If the civil and political rights of both races be equal
one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane.

Id.
305
Id. at 543 (“‘It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,’ said Mr.
Justice Bradley, ‘to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will . . . deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business.’” (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)).
306
Id. at 551. Only in 1954 did the Supreme Court find the “separate but equal”
doctrine unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (rejecting
language in Plessy suggesting “separate but equal is constitutional”).
307
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
308
Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the importance of Justice Harlan’s dissent in
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perspective on liberty not only was more expansive than that of the
founders’, but it also provided an even higher degree of detail on
national rights than the Garrisonian abolitionists had formulated. At the
turn of the twentieth century, Justice Harlan understood better than the
politicians and theorists before him the extent of harm a segregated
society would cause ostracized minorities. Justice Harlan was prescient
in foreseeing that the separate but equal doctrine would not be limited to
rail travel but would harm blacks’ ability to engage in many other
309
meaningful public activities.
C.

Modern Supreme Court Decisions

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, which the Court decided in 1968, went a long
way toward recognizing that congressional power to prevent the
incidents of involuntary servitude extends far beyond the prohibition of
310
hereditary forced labor. Jones rejected the Civil Rights Cases’ parochial
view that Congress lacks the power to prevent exclusionary, racist
practices. Jones found that a federal law based on the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was “necessary and proper” for preventing private and public
311
racial discrimination in real estate transactions. While the Jones Court
did not directly overrule the social and civil dichotomy of the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy, it recognized that preventing people from living where
they want to because of their race was an abridgement of the rights
associated with slavery.
The Court acknowledged Congress’s wide latitude to pass legislation
for preventing civil rights violations: “Surely Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
312
determination into effective legislation.” Pursuant to the Enforcement
Plessy to principled legal discourse, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
146 (1991) and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1076 (1991).
309
Justice Harlan understood the wide-ranging implication of the holding:
If a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not
travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the
use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on
one side of a street, and black citizens to keep on the other?
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
310
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to prevent private housing
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
311
Id. at 438-39.
312
Id. at 440.
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Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress can prevent state and
private encroachments on fundamental rights. Moreover, Jones required
courts to analyze human rights violations in a manner distinct from the
313
state action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion
shows a nascent understanding that slavery and its vestiges affected
society as a whole, and it makes some hesitant steps toward accepting
the abolitionist perspective of freedom. The right to contract is treated as
a natural right on which private parties cannot trample, but the opinion
fails to explore the noneconomic harms associated with slavery.
In the Supreme Court cases that followed Jones, the Court continued to
hold that Congress can prohibit private racial discrimination pursuant to
its Thirteenth Amendment power. The Court further broke down racial
barriers that had continued to inhibit freedom over a hundred years after
the end of the Civil War. The next landmark Thirteenth Amendment
case, Runyon v. McCrary, reflected the Court’s willingness to extend the
314
principle of liberty even beyond the Amendment’s framers’ notions.
Runyon addressed the narrow issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981
prohibited private schools from refusing to enroll students based on
their race. The critical part of the statute provided that “all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
315
citizens.”
Justice Potter Stewart for the majority determined that the
school violated interested parents’ contract rights because it used racial
316
criteria to deny their children enrollment.
The Court found that even
though parents whose children attended the school had the right not to
associate with blacks in their private relations, their associational right
317
could not legitimize school discrimination.
The abolitionists had
argued that slavery violated the intrinsic right to raise and educate
children, and Runyon considered discrimination in school enrollment to
318
be tied to the continued vestiges of slavery.

313

See infra Part V.A (distinguishing congressional Fourteenth and Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power).
314
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
315
Id. at 160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2004)).
316
Id. at 172-73. (“The parents . . . sought to enter into contractual relationships . . . for
educational services. . . . But neither school offered services on equal basis to white and
nonwhite students.”). Justice Byron White, writing for the dissent, argued that section 1981
could not be used to force people to enter into contracts, no matter what their motives were
for refusing to do so. Id. at 194-95 (White, J., dissenting).
317
Id. at 177-78.
318
Id. at 170-72 (describing section 1981’s and section 1982’s prohibitions against
incidents of involuntary servitude, and applying that premise to private school setting).
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As favorable as the Court’s holding was for the desegregation of
schools, it could have sent an even stronger message about the nation’s
commitment to individual liberty and the general welfare. The Court
should have used normative, rather than contractual, reasoning. It
would have done better to understand the Thirteenth Amendment as a
prohibition against arbitrary interference with parents’ educational
decisions rather than as a protection of only their contractual rights.
Constitutional liberation from slavery granted Congress the power to
protect parental autonomy, which slave codes and individual slave
319
masters had decimated.
Parents’ fundamental right to educate their
children is more compelling than their commercial right to enter into a
contract.
The use of civil rights history for interpreting the Enforcement Clause
is also helpful in understanding other associational cases. The Court
found a basis for congressional action in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
320
Recreation Ass’n.
Litigation in that case arose when a private
swimming club refused to allow blacks to join as members or to visit as
321
guests.
Three adversely affected African Americans sought damages
322
from the swimming club and asked the court to enjoin its practices.
They raised their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, both of
323
which prohibit racist leasing and rental practices.
Based on the

319
HERBERT G. GUTMAN, BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY & FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 207-09
(1976) (concluding that, despite risk of being forcefully separated by sale, slaves were able
to develop cohesive family structures); Peter Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave
Community: A Comparative Perspective, 70 J. AM. HIST. 579, 584 (1983) (discussing difficulties
faced by slaves who married slaves of other owners); Mary Beth Norton et al., AfroAmerican Family in the Age of Revolution, in SLAVERY & FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 66, at 186-87 (explaining that slavery compromised
family integrity because masters could sell their slaves for economic, subduing, or
whimsical reasons). For more regional information about the slave family that has been
developed since the 1980s, see LARRY E. HUDSON JR., TO HAVE & TO HOLD: SLAVE WORK &
FAMILY LIFE IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1997); ANN PATTON MALONE, SWEET
CHARIOT: SLAVE FAMILY & HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA
(1992). After 1865, in an effort to retain slavery through legal ruse, several states instituted
child apprenticeship laws. These statutes required slave children to serve for a term of
indenture away from their parents, so long as a white judge determined that such service
was in the children’s best interest. PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 22021 (1993). These child apprenticeships, as Leon Litwack pointed out, amounted to legalized
kidnapping and de facto slavery. LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 191, 237-38 (1979).
320
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
The Court found no need to examine whether sections 1981 and 1982 applied to
private discrimination, determining that it was sufficient that the “operative language” of
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dichotomy of rights in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court might have found
the use of the swimming pool to be a social, rather than a civil right, and
provided the plaintiffs no relief. The Court, instead, decided that §§ 1981
324
and 1982 prohibited the club from excluding people based on race.
The plaintiffs entered into the real estate purchases partly based on their
325
expectation of joining the recreation center.
The swimming club
interfered with the applicants’ right to enter into contracts by denying
326
them access to a public place of accommodation. Just as with Runyon,
the holding in Tillman is narrow, being grounded on contract principles
rather than on the federal enforcement power to prevent violations of
fundamental rights associated with the general welfare. A more
principled Court rationale could have articulated a notion of national
citizenship that includes the right to freely partake of community
amenities without the burden of racism. Prohibiting the use of racist
association qualifications is a legitimate aim of a post-Reconstruction
Congress in its overall commitment to the general welfare.
An overview of case law decided since Jones shows just how far the
Thirteenth Amendment can reach, even when litigants rely on ancient
civil rights statutes — in particular, sections 1981 and 1982 — that are
modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Certainly, discrimination in
real estate transactions and private schools is not, in and of itself, literally
slavery nor involuntary servitude. Rather, the Court interpreted the
Thirteenth Amendment as granting Congress the discretionary power to
analyze and end impediments to civil liberties. Congress can go much
further than these nineteenth-century statutes by passing new statutes
pursuant to its Enforcement Clause authority. The policy behind civil
rights initiatives must be predicated on contemporary sensibilities that
do not violate the commitment to liberal equality adopted into the
Thirteenth Amendment.
V.

CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Recent Supreme Court decisions have limited Congress’s ability to rely
on its traditional Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers
to pass civil rights legislation. Sections A and B demonstrate that recent
decisions have not eroded Thirteenth Amendment authority for securing
both was “traceable” to section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 439-40.
324
Id. at 438-39
325
Id. at 437.
326
Id. at 439-40.
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the liberal equality first promised to all citizens during the Revolution,
elaborated through abolitionists, and made part of the Constitution in
the aftermath of the Civil War. Section C then evaluates the extent to
which the Thirteenth Amendment permits Congress to enforce civil
rights.
A.
1.

Relationship Between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
Recent Judicial Fourteenth Amendment Approach

Recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has limited Congress’s
ability to pursue civil rights initiatives. The Rehnquist Court has crafted
a “responsive,” rather than substantive, interpretation of Congress’s
327
Section 5 authority.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court found
unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as applied to
state and local governments. The Court explained that the statute was
“so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that
it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
328
unconstitutional behavior.”
The case limited Congress’s Section 5
authority to passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees: “The Fourteenth Amendment’s
history confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the
329
Enforcement Clause.”
The Boerne Court based its rationale on statements made during
congressional debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the
effect that Congress should not be given affirmative power to make civil
rights laws since that would intrude on powers traditionally vested in
330
the states.
Ruth Colker has researched and debunked the Court’s
misleadingly selective reliance on speeches made by congressmen who
331
opposed the Amendment’s ratification.
The Court failed to mention
that of the four congressmen on whose views it predicated its responsive
332
reasoning in Boerne, only one supported the Fourteenth Amendment.

327

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
329
Id. at 520.
330
Id. at 520-21.
331
See Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43
B.C. L. REV. 783, 797-817 (2002).
332
See id. at 792. Specifically, in Boerne the Court quoted Representatives Hale,
Hotchkiss, and Rogers and Senator Stewart. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-21. “Of the
Representatives quoted by the Court, only Representative Hotchkiss voted for ratification
328
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Relying on the understanding of ratification opponents to bolster
constitutional interpretation is a dubious method of judicial
interpretation, particularly if the method claims to adhere to the framers’
original intent.
The Court reiterated this remedial interpretation in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, finding that Congress overstepped its Section 5
enforcement authority by extending the Age Discrimination in
333
Employment Act’s applicability to state and local governments.
The
Court held the statute’s breach of state sovereign immunity to be “out of
334
proportion to its supposed remedial or preventive objectives.”
Other
cases dealing with Section 5 have applied this responsive
335
“proportionality and congruency” test to the Patent Remedy Act, the
336
337
Violence Against Women Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
338
and the Family and Medical Leave Act.
2.

Comparing Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment Powers

Both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments contain enforcement
provisions for enacting federal laws that protect liberty and equality
interests essential to the general welfare. They are based on a civil rights
tradition grounded in revolutionary assertions of liberty against the
British yoke of slavery and radical abolitionist goals of using the
Constitution to end chattel servitude and all its associated practices.
Union victory in the Civil War heralded, in President Lincoln’s words, “a
339
new birth of freedom.”
That nascent hope for change was partly
embodied in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. These
amendments were passed to provide all Americans, regardless of their
340
race, with the equal opportunity to live self-directed lives.
The two

of the Amendment. Representative Hale abstained and Representative Rogers voted
against the measure.” Colker, supra note 331, at 792.
333
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
334
Id. at 82.
335
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999).
336
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 698, 625-26 (2000) (quoting Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S.
at 647, and Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533).
337
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
338
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (quoting Garrett, 531
U.S. at 368).
339
Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/getty.html.
340
See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12
LAW & INEQ. 381, 422 (1994) (writing that Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
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amendments differ, however, in scope and application.
These
differences are significant for formulating civil rights policy.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement, for instance,
sets limits on what discriminatory conduct Congress can regulate. The
Supreme Court has narrowly construed the applicability of the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Civil Rights
Cases. The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand has no such
limitation on statutory authority.
Boerne took the state action
341
requirement for granted and even further straightjacketed Congress by
finding that Section 5 allows it “to enforce” but not “to determine what
342
constitutes a constitutional violation.”
The Supreme Court also
embraced the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement in
343
United States v. Morrison.
Writing for the majority, Justice William
Rehnquist explained that the Court would not deviate from “the timehonored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms,
344
prohibits only state action.” Morrison claimed that it was based on the
doctrine of stare decisis and the “insight attributable to the Members of
the Court at that time,” since they had “intimate knowledge and
345
familiarity with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Statutes passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, on the other
hand, need not concern themselves with state actors. While the
American Revolution was against state-sponsored tyranny perpetrated
by agents of the British government, abolitionists used the founding
generation’s broad notions of liberty in their advocacy against private
actors who owned slaves or facilitated the institution of slavery. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery regardless of whether it is
practiced by state actors or private parties and irrespective of whether it
is legally tolerated or unlawfully perpetrated. The Civil Rights Cases
recognized that Congress can criminalize private discrimination though
its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Decades later, the

Amendment stands for promise of good life); Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, & the
Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705, 706 (1998) (writing about rationalist
conception of human nature, considered to be characteristic of liberty secured under
Fourteenth Amendment).
341
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
342
Id. at 519. Both Boerne and United States v. Morrison failed to evaluate the Court’s
interpretation of “enforce” in Thirteenth Amendment cases, relying, instead, on the Civil
Rights Cases’ “niggardly” interpretation of that term.
Jed Rubenfeld, The AntiAntidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1155-56 (2002).
343
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000).
344
Id. at 621.
345
Id. at 622.
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Warren and Burger Courts, in Jones v. Mayer and Runyan v. McCrary
respectively, confirmed that the Thirteenth Amendment enables
Congress to pass criminal and civil laws against private party
346
defendants.
Thus, civil rights laws passed under congressional
Thirteenth Amendment authority can enjoin innumerable private acts
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach.
The Thirteenth Amendment has the further advantage of providing
the authority for unequivocal regulation that need not be responsive.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has a “responsive” role,
according to the most recent line of cases. In Boerne, the Court found that
Congress could not choose to act unless it was responding to
347
unconstitutional behavior.
Again, in Kimel, the Court held that
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power could not be used to abrogate
sovereign immunity where there was no indication that passage of a
348
statute was meant to respond to discriminatory state conduct.
Thirteenth Amendment-based statutes may likewise respond to
discrimination, but they may also interpret the meaning of “liberty” in
the Constitution and act upon it. Pursuant to this scheme, the Court
remains the final arbiter of what the Constitution means, but Congress
can act on its own findings, which may be constructive and not merely
responsive. The Thirteenth Amendment standard of review is a low349
level, rational basis scrutiny.
Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the
federal legislature may, and indeed should, pass laws that are conducive
for autonomy to thrive.
Such a perspective should not merely be confined to currently existing
statutes. Congress may pass civil legislation more sensitive to human
rights concerns than the property-centered sections 1981 and 1982.
Congress’s enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment not
only aims to prevent interference with fundamental rights, which is the
350
extent of Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, but

346
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 , 176 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 429-30 (1968).
347
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
348
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (“[J]udged against the backdrop
of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is ‘so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’” (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)).
349
See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
350
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
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also enables the federal government to actualize the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble.
B.
1.

Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause

Pre-Lopez Commerce Clause Approach

Besides making it more difficult for Congress to achieve civil rights
reform through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has placed new
constraints on traditional Commerce Clause power. Prior to Lopez in
1995, Congress virtually had plenary power to pass laws that were
351
rationally related to the national economy.
The wave of judicial
deference, which began during the New Deal, crested during the 1960s
when Congress passed a series of civil rights statutes, most notably the
352
Civil Rights Act of 1964, pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.
The Warren Court supported Congress’s creative strategy for
circumnavigating around the eighty-year-old state action restrictions in
353
354
United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. Civil rights leaders,
just as their legislative allies, thought that the federal government should

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). The Court first connected
governmental interference with the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). The Court found that the Clause only protected citizens
from state interference with the privileges and immunities of national, but not state,
citizenship. Id. at 61-62. Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause prevents the government’s
interference with the exercise of fundamental rights “unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause has a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests’ . . . .” Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997)).
351
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 because family farm consumption had cumulative effect on
national wheat market). United States v. Lopez did not overrule Wickard, but called it “the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.” United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
352
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
353
106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13,
which punished private conspiracies).
354
109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
enforcement powers are limited to state action); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318
(1880) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment provisions “all have reference to State action
exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals”).
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make private discrimination actionable in federal courts. The Supreme
Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, relied on the
Commerce Clause to find the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional
rather than overturn post-Reconstruction jurisprudence that established
the Fourteenth Amendment state action requirement.
Some of the most important cases establishing the standard of review
for evaluating the constitutionality of civil rights laws arose under Title
II of the Act, which enjoins private businesses from withholding public
356
services on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, a 1964 watershed case, determined that
Congress could prevent a motel from racist interference with the
357
interstate travel of black patrons wanting to rent a room.
Without
second-guessing the extent of congressional findings, the Court
determined that the Senate and House made a rational enactment in light
of overwhelming evidence that hotels and motels were obstructing
358
interstate commerce. That same year, the Court found in Katzenbach v.
McClung that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutionally prohibited a
family-owned restaurant from discriminating against potential
359
patrons. In that case, the Court explicitly stated that Congress was not
required to make any formal findings as to the economic effect of
360
legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause. These cases were
based on the de minimis review of interstate commerce regulations that,
in Wickard v. Filburn, had even upheld a federal law that applied to
361
privately-grown wheat intended for private consumption.

355
Many people, including Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and constitutional
scholars like Gerald Gunther, counseled Civil Rights leaders to use the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the Solicitor General Archibald Cox understood that without
overruling the Civil Rights Cases, such a suggestion was a nonstarter. Seth P. Waxman,
Twins At Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1312 (2000).
Since stare decisis indicated that the likelihood of overruling the 1883 decision was small,
Cox convinced the President to follow the Commerce Clause strategy. Id.
356
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 2000). Title II is applicable to four categories of “places”:
(1) “establishment[s] which provid[e] lodging to transient guests,” (2) “facilit[ies]
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises,” (3) “place[s] of
exhibition or entertainment,” or (4) “any establishment . . . which is physically located
within the premises of any establishment” listed in this statute. Id. § 2000a(b).
357
The Court found that the Heart of Atlanta Motel was engaged in interstate
commerce since it advertised nationally and attracted part of its business from persons
using interstate highways. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243
(1964).
358
Id. at 257.
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For decades, Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung stood for the
deferential principle that Congress could pass any necessary laws
362
rationally connected to interstate commerce. The Court did not second
guess congressional fact-finding when a statute met this minimum
363
threshold.
This commitment to upholding economically predicated
regulations extended so far that, in Daniel v. Paul, even selling hot dog
buns at a concession stand and playing a jukebox for entertainment
made an otherwise private club into a regulated business involved in
364
interstate commerce.
So long as the legislature did not pass a law
based on arbitrary and concocted findings, the Court time and again
found statutes constitutional. Prior to 1997, the Court never categorically
required Congress to provide evidence about the economic consequences
leading it to enact statutes on the basis of its Commerce Clause
365
prerogative.
Such a requirement, Harold Krent argued,
“unquestionably would fundamentally alter the relationship between the
366
judiciary and the legislature.”
2.

Rehnquist Court Commerce Clause Approach

By the 1990s, use of the Commerce Clause was a well established
approach to protecting civil rights. The Court altered the dynamic of
judicial review in United States v. Lopez, where it found unconstitutional a
federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of firearms near
367
schools, and in United States v. Morrison, where it found Congress
overstepped its authority in creating a federal civil remedy for gender368
motivated violence. In the name of federalism, the Court increased its
369
oversight of the legislative process.
362

Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-62.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]his
Court has not previously held that Congress must document the existence of a problem in
every State prior to proposing a national solution.”).
364
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305, 308 (1969).
365
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1996). For an earlier rendition of the same
point, see Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) (“The Court does not review the sufficiency of the
evidence in the record to support congressional action. . . . No case has ever held that a
record is constitutionally required.”).
367
In similar fashion, the Court encroached on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 authority both in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619, and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
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Morrison, 529 U.S. 613-14.
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Rather than use the rational basis test, the Lopez Court determined that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional because it sought to
prevent an activity that did not have a “substantial effect” on interstate
370
commerce. Unlike the post-1937 New Deal Court, in cases like United
371
State v. Darby and Wickard, or Warren Court interpretations, like Heart
of Atlanta Motel and McClung, the Rehnquist Court criticized
policymakers for not making an adequate showing that guns carried
372
near schools were connected to any “economic enterprise.”
Justice
Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Lopez, found no basis for deviating from
the accepted rational basis test, meaning that Congress should be able to
regulate any activity “significantly (or substantially)” affecting national
373
commerce. Congress’s ability to pass a law covering the use of guns, at
least those with parts that had gone through interstate commerce, would
have seemed more secure than its ability to pass the federal regulation
found constitutional in Daniel, but the Rehnquist Court made an
unambiguous shift away from Warren Court precedents.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in Lopez, also
spoke for the Court in Morrison. Unlike the congressional record offered
on the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress provided overwhelming
374
information about the interstate effects of gender-motivated violence.
Yet, the Court rejected Congress’s policy explanation that violence
375
against women substantially affects interstate commerce.
The
lawmakers had relied on a “mountain of data,” including information
from no less than nine congressional hearings and reports from gender

precedents and found that the Court’s recent trend of striking laws because of a
purportedly inadequate congressional record “is highly questionable on precedential,
constitutional, and practical grounds.” A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone,
Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of
Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 395 (2001).
370
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
371
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
372
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-61.
373
Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer pointed out that, contrary to the
majority’s holding, Commerce Clause cases have not consistently used the “substantial
effects” label: “I use the word ‘significant’ because the word ‘substantial’ implies a
somewhat narrower power than recent precedent suggests. . . . But to speak of ‘substantial
effect’ rather than ‘significant effect’ would make no difference in this case.” Id. at 616.
From an opposite perspective, Justice Thomas considered the substantial effects text to be a
virtually limitless grant of congressional power: “We must . . . respect a constitutional line
that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.”
Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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bias task forces in twenty-one states, which had been amassed over four
376
years.
The Court disregarded the compiled data, finding the Violence
Against Women Act unconstitutional because gender-motivated crimes
377
“are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”
The
reassessment of congressional evidence was reminiscent of Lochner-era
378
substantive due process review. Gender-motivated violence, the Court
found, “not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods
involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
379
States.” The Court concluded that Congress may not regulate conduct
solely based on its “aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” but only
on the basis of either the defendant’s effect on the national economy or
380
the activity’s economic nature.
The new line of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases
has created a problem for civil rights activists. It threatens to slow the
legislative process by making data gathering cost-prohibitive and
potentially futile, given that the Court can now disregard the quantity
and quality of Congress’s findings by invoking constitutional-sounding
language. Neither can Congress identify which constitutional rights it
can protect without the Court’s prior guidance. Given these constraints
on legislative powers, civil rights leaders need to develop a strategy for
enforcing civil rights that can avoid these new hurdles.
3.

Distinguishing the Thirteenth Amendment from the Commerce
Clause

The recent developments in Commerce Clause cases indicate that there
are significant obstacles to relying on congressional authority over
interstate commerce to develop a legislative civil rights approach.
Statutes passed to end arbitrary discrimination and relying on
Commerce Clause authority remain vulnerable to counterarguments
376

Id. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
378
Id. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the minds of the majority there is a new
animating theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as the old
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industrial due process is striking.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-67 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing recent Supreme Court federalist approaches to Lochner v.
United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983)).
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about their effect on the national economy. Federal laws relying on the
Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, deal primarily with conduct
rationally related to oppressive control, not interstate commerce.
Abolitionists sought and achieved an end to all slavery, not only the type
that could be reasonably linked to the interstate economy. The
Thirteenth Amendment even prohibits involuntary servitude occurring
entirely within one state and having absolutely no economic benefit to
slaveholders. For instance, the keeping of a sex slave would be
egregious even if the kept person were never taken out of state nor used
for any material gain.
While economic arguments can be of little consequence to policies
based on the Thirteenth Amendment, they can be dispositive when it
comes to civil rights legislation predicated on the Commerce Clause.
The Court’s determination in Morrison that misogynistic violence has no
substantial effect on national commerce is irrelevant to evaluating
whether the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
prevent such violence. The Jones rational basis inquiry has never been
altered in the way that Lopez and Morrison altered Commerce Clause
analysis.
Had Congress relied on its Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power in passing the Violence Against Women Act, the
Court might have deferred to legislators as long as they had found that
gender-motivated violence was rationally analogous to arbitrary
domination and that the statute was a necessary and proper means of
dealing with it. The only question left for the Court would have been
whether the statutory means chosen by Congress were “reasonably
381
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.”
Another advantage of the Thirteenth Amendment is its unequivocal
stand against despotism that goes back to the philosophy that
revolutionaries included in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution’s Preamble. The Commerce Clause, on the other hand, is a
morally-neutral provision that could just as readily be used in a slave
society as in a liberal republic. Its history bears this out. Even though by
382
1824 the Court, in Gibbons v. Ogden, determined that Congress had the
power to regulate any commerce between states, slavery continued
unabated and exploited interstate commercial outlets. One can even find
indications from debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention
that the Commerce Clause was part of the founders’ compromise with

381
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (explaining use
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Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

2006]

A Civil Rights Approach

1843

383

the slave states. Even though the Clause presumably granted Congress
the power to regulate the slave trade between states, the national
government tolerated the practice, and some antebellum congressmen
384
even owned slaves.
By its very terms, the Thirteenth Amendment is not given to a neutral
reading on the subject of private- or state-sponsored discrimination. The
Congressional debates leading to the Amendment’s ratification referred
often to the unfulfilled vision of the nation’s founders. There is nothing
neutral about a constitutional provision containing a moral stance
against the exploitation of human lives. Understanding the Supreme
Court’s holding on Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power by
filtering regulations through the broad definition of “slavery” provides
an understanding of what the Amendment stands for. It provides
Congress with the means to continue the work of the Reconstruction
Congress, using contemporary sensibilities to understand what
fundamental rights the national government can protect. This does not
mean that a Thirteenth Amendment civil rights approach should
displace Commerce Clause efforts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Rather, it brings into bold relief the continued vitality of Jones in
establishing Congress’s broad interpretive power at a time when Lopez
and Morrison have made the passage of new civil rights legislation under
the Commerce Clause more onerous.
C.

Construing Thirteenth Amendment Liberty: How Far Might It Extend?

The ideas of the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers, while invaluable,
cannot be the endpoint of construction. Its framers were men of their
time whose social and political backgrounds made them incapable of
foreseeing every potential application of the Amendment. Their ideas
and those of their abolitionist mentors are nevertheless essential for
comprehending the Amendment’s significance to contemporary
incidents of involuntary servitude, such as the forced sex trade, the

383
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384
Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation: A
Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 123 (1998) (stating that Congress had
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exploitation of domestic workers, and the peonage of migrant farmers.
Judicial opinion is likewise essential for formulating a constructive
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Historical and
precedential examination, when supplemented with normative analysis,
is useful to establish the constitutional limitations of congressional
386
power.
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the
enforcement power to effectuate the moral principles of the Preamble to
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. In this regard,
the Thirteenth Amendment was both a new beginning for the nation and
a constructive means for enforcing its foundational principles of liberty
and general well-being.
The Thirteenth Amendment was a drastic break from the clauses of the
1787 Constitution that protected slavery. Section 2 of the Amendment
expanded the federal government’s ability to protect individuals by
granting Congress the power to protect civil liberties, rather than rely on
states to do so. The Thirteenth Amendment is the bridge between a
Constitution beholden to the aristocratic practices of slavocracy and one
committed to coequal liberty. The Amendment, thereby, secured the
Preamble’s principled grant of governmental power. It protects the right
of unobtrusive autonomy to carry out deliberative decisions, limiting
autonomy whenever it arbitrarily interferes with the reasonable
purposes of other citizens. The assurance of freedom protects dignity
rights as long as they do not infringe the equal liberty rights of others.
This approach balances autonomy with welfare to achieve a liberating
sense of mutual purpose for congressional initiatives.
The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment also provides an
enforceable national guarantee of freedom that is not subject to state
prerogative. Federal legislative power is available against any form of
arbitrary domination. The scheme protects more than the freedoms
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and extends to any intrinsic freedom,
such as the ability to freely travel between states. Fair civil rights
initiatives must balance individual liberties against the national interests
of a diverse but equally free people. The Enforcement Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment provides lawmakers with the power to craft
laws that are tied to the Declaration of Independence’s vision of a free
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and equal citizenry. The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, under
the influence of abolitionist theorists, determined that liberty was a
national right and provided the federal government with the
constitutional authority to secure it against all racist discrimination.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has extended the Thirteenth
Amendment’s applicability to coercive acts committed against members
of any race, not only against blacks. In the years following the
Amendment’s ratification, Radical Republicans passed civil rights
legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act
387
of 1871, to protect their black and white allies. The risk to missionaries,
teachers, and politicians who came to the South after the Civil War was
388
almost as great as the danger blacks faced from mob violence.
Since
then, a variety of cases have defined who can bring suit under legislation
promulgated pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. In the SlaughterHouse Cases, the Court held that the Amendment applies to “Mexican
389
peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.” Even though “race” is a
fluid term, the Supreme Court later held that contemporary racial
classifications should not constrict the Amendment’s applicability. In
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, a 1987 case arising from the private
desecration of a synagogue, the Court found that when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Jews and Arabs were among the groups
390
classified as distinct races.
The Court, therefore, concluded that the
Act prevents property discrimination reminiscent of servitude from
391
being committed against Jews and Arabs.
The Amendment’s protections apply to anyone who is subject to
arbitrary restraints on the enjoyment of freedom. The Abolition
Amendment freed slaves from much more than their obligation to
engage in unrequited labor. A constricted understanding of its purposes
would be ahistorical: The country’s framers understood that there were
different gradations of slavery — a variety of infringements on equal
liberty that were incidental to chattel servitude. The Thirteenth
Amendment prohibits full-blown slavery as well as conduct depriving

387
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individuals of the fundamental rights that catalyzed the American
Revolution. The Reconstruction Congress made the protection of those
rights against state prejudices obligatory on the country. Following the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Declaration and Preamble
were no longer aspirational statements but enforceable aims that
provided guidance and placed the primary onus for civil rights on the
federal government.
The Thirteenth Amendment ended all practices incidental of servitude,
392
including arbitrary limitations on association, travel, and employment.
The Thirteenth Amendment, inferentially, prohibited all repressive
conduct rationally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply
racist labor practices. Congress is empowered to act against the arbitrary
restraint of freedom, and its enactments are subject to rational level
judicial review.
Statutes should protect free and equal persons’ rights to pursue
qualitatively good lives. Masters had suppressed slaves’ aspirations,
prohibiting them from entering into marital contracts, from choosing
professions, from learning to read, and from making a host of other
important life decisions. Slavery devalued the Preamble’s governmental
commitment to freedom. Consequently, laws that are passed under
Section 2 must make it easier for people to express their individuality
and must prevent arbitrarily domineering private and state actions.
The Thirteenth Amendment requires that the federal legislature and
judiciary provide the security necessary for citizens to direct their lives
pursuant to unique plans, relationships, and interests. Slavery denies
persons the opportunity to creatively engage with the world by
restricting their right to pursue professions, choose how to raise their
children, and make reasonable choices among an infinite variety of
domestic options. A free society allows persons to make plans for their
lives rather than externally necessitating them to act on undesired
alternatives. Becoming a carpenter because of an interest in the craft is
significantly different from having no option but to choose that trade.
Teaching one’s own children only English differs from being prohibited
from teaching them foreign languages. Living in a predominantly
Jewish neighborhood by choice is different than being forbidden from
living elsewhere.
The Thirteenth Amendment shifts the balance of authority for
protecting these civil rights away from states and in favor of the national
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government. One of the federal government’s primary functions is to
protect the common good — laws must aim to pragmatically improve
people’s lives and to help them flourish as self-directed individuals. The
coequal freedoms of self-determination and self-realization are
conducive to the overall good of U.S. society. Laws that require citizens
to deal fairly can reduce individual conflicts and thereby increase social
tranquility. Thus, a policy designed to promote liberty as a means of
achieving the common good has an antidiscriminatory principle built
into it: one cannot arbitrarily restrict another’s liberty and credibly insist
that such an act benefits everyone.
Civil liberties are not absolute; rather, they may be limited by the
rights of others. People living in an organized society may not exercise
their liberty to intentionally cause more than a trivial amount of harm to
others. The Thirteenth Amendment is not a right for license but rather
for independence of choice. It does not sanction indiscriminate behavior
that disregards the rights of others. Instead, it provides a national
commitment to provide legal redress for arbitrary constraints on
393
independent and unobtrusive choices.
The Thirteenth Amendment
prevents the exploitation of personal liberty that interferes with others’
legitimate pursuits. This constraint on the Amendment’s significance
derives from slavers’ abuse of freedom. After all, masters had abused
their property right to possess and sell slaves. The Amendment ended
this domineering perspective of constitutional liberty because its
implementation denied the Declaration’s and Preamble’s assurances to a
host of persons for whom the drive for a good life was just as
fundamental as it was for their tormentors. The Amendment was meant
to counteract that abuse of power by enabling Congress to prohibit any
abridgments on people’s rights to be self-directed and self-motivated.
This conclusion follows not only from the theoretical construct of liberty
but also from the denigrating nature of the master-servant relationship.
Laws based on the Thirteenth Amendment should safeguard the right
of citizens to live meaningful lives unobstructed by acts of arbitrary
domination. In drafting civil rights bills, legislators should assess any
remaining arbitrary infringements on the meaningful assertion of
individual and group liberties. Congress’s task is dynamic, requiring it
to evaluate contemporary circumstances and to craft vigorous responses
to modern or ancient forms of discrimination.
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Federal laws against such practices should be drafted in ways that
394
would best benefit all citizens, rather than a particular interest group.
The nation rises or falls as a whole. The Thirteenth Amendment makes
available to all the full enjoyment of the rights essential to a free society.
It does not take for granted that each person will act with reciprocal
concern and respect for fellow citizens.
Instead, the Thirteenth
Amendment grants Congress the power to enact laws against arbitrary
domination. By securing personal safety and stability, the Amendment
protects the nation’s citizenry against whimsical coercion. Judicial
review serves to prevent congressional power from being hijacked for
autocratic purposes.
Congress has thus far done little to fulfill its legislative obligation to
liberty rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, and only a handful of
cases interpret congressional power. Congress’s failure to act has
reduced the Amendment’s effectiveness but not its enormous potential
for change. In spite of more than a century of virtual neglect, the
congressional authority to pass a variety of civil rights laws remains
viably intact.
CONCLUSION
The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress
the power to provide for the general welfare by protecting civil liberties.
The ideology of Revolutionary founders and abolitionists exerted a
profound effect on the Amendment’s proponents.
Abolitionist
perspectives about the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble
influenced Radical Republicans in their decision to pass a comprehensive
constitutional amendment for the national protection of liberty. For the
Amendment’s framers, the concept of slavery, and its concomitant
harms, was nearly as broad as that notion was for Revolutionaries and
abolitionists.
The Reconstruction Congress developed the Thirteenth Amendment
into a far-reaching guaranty of any fundamental right essential to human
liberty. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment aims to provide
legislators with the means for implementing protections of fundamental
liberties, such as the rights to travel and to marry. Today Section 2 still
empowers Congress to reflect on contemporary conditions that are
analogous to involuntary servitude and slavery and to pass federal
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legislation to meet civil rights ends.
In the years following the Civil War, the Supreme Court rejected a
comprehensive reading of liberty in favor of a narrow understanding
that was more closely linked to the Amendment’s opponents than to its
395
supporters.
The Supreme Court subscribed to this narrow
interpretation for many years. The Court eventually changed course,
realizing that the Amendment grants Congress the right to prevent many
obstructions to freedom, such as discriminatory contractual practices,
that are not literally connected to forced labor. Despite the Court’s
recognition of broad congressional authority to define the incidents and
badges of involuntary servitude, Congress has rarely exercised its
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment. Notwithstanding
this oversight the Amendment offers a wealth of possibilities for
enacting civil rights legislation predicated on the nation’s historic
commitment to liberal equality.
Using its Thirteenth Amendment power, Congress can deal with such
396
nationwide harms as hate crimes,
hate speech directed against
397
398
The Thirteenth
identifiable groups, and oppressive labor practices.
Amendment’s national guarantee of freedom is a powerful alternative to
the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause for passing civil
rights legislation. That alternative has taken on greater import since the
Rehnquist Court reduced congressional effectiveness under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
achieve the goal of coequal liberty, Congress may use its Thirteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause power to pass statutes against private
and public discrimination.
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